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Executive Summary 
As part of The Bush School of Government and Public Service capstone project, this report 
was conducted in an effort to provide recovery assistance to Texas communities in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Harvey. Specifically, this report focuses on the City of Wharton, Texas, a small 
community 60 miles southwest of Houston that experienced extensive damage and destruction 
from Hurricane Harvey. The following report is the product of several months of work conducted 
by a team of Master of Public Service and Administration graduate students using available 
literature, case studies, secondary data analysis, and stakeholder interviews to provide a detailed 
analysis of the storm and its aftermath experienced in Wharton, including recommendations to 
community leaders for current and future recovery actions, areas to increase resilience, and 
possible priorities for consideration to improve response and recovery for future natural disasters.  
The report begins by providing a comprehensive overview of existing literature on recovery 
following hurricane related disasters and examines vulnerability, problems faced by communities 
in their response and mitigation efforts, and identified best practices to increase resilience and 
improve hazard mitigation. In working to understand the effects of natural disasters that have 
occurred in the United States previously, two case studies on the 1993 Great Midwest Floods and 
the 2010 Rhode Island flooding event were conducted. This report also includes a summary of 
information gained from 32 stakeholder interviews and their experiences during Harvey and the 
recovery process. These interviews provide important insight for understanding public perceptions 
of response, recovery, and problems experienced in Wharton during and in the aftermath of the 
storm. A secondary data analysis using survey data from the Kaiser Family Foundation Post-
Harvey Survey and the Texas A&M Hurricane Harvey Household Survey provides accounts of 
individual’s experiences in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey and supports key themes and issues 
identified previously in the report. 
 Recommendations are also provided to the City of Wharton regarding actions community 
leaders can take for recovery, comprehensive planning, and communication and collaboration 
practices. Below are some key points which highlight relevant findings that will be discussed in 
more detail in the full report:  
● The importance of effective communication and emergency management policies for 
successful disaster management and recovery.  
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● The importance of collaboration among community members and outside resources 
throughout the recovery process. 
● The importance of conducting secondary data analysis to provide relevant information 
from citizen’s experiences following the disaster to support the value of emergency 
planning and community engagement in the planning process. 
● The importance of learning from prior flooding events to prepare for and mitigate risks 
associated with devastating events such as Harvey. 
● The importance of having a process for updating existing emergency response and 
preparedness plans to ensure successful response and recovery. 
The severe rainfall, flooding, and damaging winds associated with Hurricane Harvey have 
had devastating effects on communities in Texas. Specifically, small communities with limited 
personnel and resources are experiencing difficulties in fully recovering from the aftermath and 
damage the storm had on housing, businesses, public facilities, and recreational spaces. These 
effects, especially on small cities such as Wharton, serve as an important example to the Texas 
Legislature for the need to develop and update comprehensive disaster plans and resilience 
strategies, not only along the Gulf Coast, but across the State of Texas. This project will seek to 
identify strategies, actions, and best-practices to help local leaders and citizens in the City of 
Wharton in their long-term recovery efforts.   
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Introduction 
 Hurricanes have affected the Gulf Coast and Southeastern Coasts of the United States 
throughout much of the nation’s history. From 1850 to 2017, the United States has experienced 
over 290 hurricanes, with 91 being classified as Major Hurricanes which includes storms that cause 
severe amounts of damage and loss of life. In recognizing states that have experienced Major 
Hurricanes, Texas and Florida have been identified as confronting the most with a total of 56 
during the time period examined (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2018). As a 
result of this history and experiencing the damaging effects of hurricane activity, recovery 
planning and actions to address existing vulnerabilities represent key elements of preparedness 
and community resilience.   
On August 26, 2017, Hurricane Harvey made landfall in Texas as a Category 4 hurricane 
near the coastal city of Rockport. Harvey immediately wreaked havoc on the coast and, as it moved 
inland, the storm slowed significantly to five miles per hour (Blake & Zelinsky, 2018).  This 
decrease in movement resulted in the storm hovering over many areas of southeast Texas pouring 
over 60 inches of rain in a nine-day period, with the average recorded rainfall being 48 inches 
(Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2018; Blake & 
Zelinsky, 2018). Homes were destroyed, infrastructure left in disrepair, livelihoods were lost, and 
103 people were left dead in the wake of Hurricane Harvey. In examining the economic impacts 
of Harvey, damage totaled $125 billion, making it the single most expensive natural disaster in 
2017 (Blake & Zelinsky, 2018). The effects of Harvey and other powerful events including 
Hurricane Irma experienced in the Atlantic categorized 2017 to be the most costly year monetarily 
for natural disasters in recorded history (Mooney, 2018).  
While coastal towns like Galveston and Rockport dealt with high winds and storm surges, 
many inland towns and cities faced severe flooding from the heavy rainfall. The bayous and rivers 
many inland communities bordered spilled their banks and flooded surrounding homes and 
businesses. Communities became cut off from resources, making it difficult for supplies and 
assistance to be reached. The City of Wharton is settled directly on the Colorado River, with many 
homes and businesses situated within several hundred feet of its banks. The rainfall from Harvey 
caused the river to swell and crest at 54 feet with rising waters flooding the North and West side 
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of town. Over 2,000 homes and businesses were damaged or flooded in Wharton County during 
the storm (Blake & Zelinsky, 2018).  
An outline of this report is as follows; 1) a brief description of Harvey’s rainfall and the 
Colorado River Basin; 2) a comprehensive literature review that examines the effects of flooding, 
the importance of planning, and community actions for recovery found in academic articles, 
government documents, and department reports; 3) detailed case study analyses that examines two 
communities who experienced similar challenges with flooding events and identifies lessons 
learned and best practices that may be emulated in other communities; 4) a secondary data analysis 
analyzing the responses from public opinion surveys in Texas conducted by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation and Texas A&M Public Policy Research Institute; 5) an analysis of 32 interviews with 
key stakeholders to understand experiences of those affected by the storm and identify local 
challenges and successful practices for recovery an analysis of 32 interviews with key stakeholders 
to understand experiences of those affected by the storm and identify local challenges and 
successful practices for recovery; and 6) final recommendations for consideration to the City of 
Wharton to improve recovery outcomes and strengthen planning practices.  
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Technical Overview of the Region    
1. Precipitation  
Hurricane Harvey was one of the greatest magnitude rainfalls the United States has 
experienced. Eighteen locations across Texas reported 48 inches or more of rainfall, with 60.54 
inches being the highest recorded amount (Blake & Zelinsky, 2018). This rainfall caused severe 
flooding within the Houston metro region and river-basin communities throughout Southeast 
Texas. The rainfall rate was so severe in some areas that standard rain gauges could not be emptied 
to measure proper rainfall. In an analysis completed by NOAA, it was found that Harvey rainfall 
flooded areas that previously had a 0.1% chance of flooding in any given year, meaning that areas 
experienced flooding they would only experience every 1,000 years (Blake & Zelinsky, 2018). 
According to the National Hurricane Center and NOAA, Harvey’s rainfall event was unusual due 
to a weak stationary front that occupied the Southeast Texas area blanketing the region with bands 
of warm humid air from the Gulf of Mexico (Blake & Zelinsky, 2018). The stationary nature of 
the front and stagnant air ultimately contributed to the heavy rain and Harvey’s 48-hour stall over 
Southeast Texas, thus resulting in the increasingly high amount of rainfall.    
2. Colorado River Basin  
 The Colorado River Basin lies within the Natural Southeast Texas Coastal Plains Region. 
The river is fed by a variety of creeks and streams that slope throughout the county while shallow 
and deep ditches work to carry runoff water towards the Colorado River. In examining surface 
properties throughout the region, soil composition within Wharton County is primarily made up 
of loam, sand, clay, and alluvial soils (Wharton County Emergency Management & JSW, 2015).  
The predominant clay and silt geology of Wharton County can create low-mud 
permeability, meaning that the region is prone to experiencing both flash flooding and major 
flooding after heavy rainfall. In working to address and reduce the effects of flooding in the region, 
prior construction of large reservoirs along the Colorado River can mitigate some flooding and 
potentially disastrous events (Wharton County Emergency Management & JSW, 2015).  
Approximately 223,700 acres of Wharton County lies within the 100-year floodplain, and 
260,080 acres lies within the 500-year floodplain. Specifically, for the City of Wharton, 2,888 
acres lie within the 100-year floodplain and 4,131 acres lie within the 500-year floodplain. In total, 
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4.3% of Wharton’s 100-year floodplain is made up of developed land. The combination of the 
heavy presence of hydrophobic soils (clay and silt) and development along the river increases the 
effects storm runoff has on a community. As a result, excess runoff increases the probability of 
flash flooding and greatly influences how the Colorado River floods within the county (Wharton 
County Emergency Management & JSW, 2015).  
While risks associated with dam failure extend throughout the county, that of levee failure 
is limited to the City of Wharton and the southern portions of the county. Wharton County could 
potentially be affected by several high-hazard dams that are located outside of the county. If the 
failure of one of these high-hazard dams did occur, it could result in loss of life. Other high-hazard 
dams are located outside the county and their drainage systems enter Wharton County either by 
direct drainage through parts of the county or by inflow into the Colorado River or San Bernard 
River upstream from Colorado County (Wharton County Emergency Management & JSW, 2015). 
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Literature Review 
1. Purpose 
This literature review will provide an in-depth analysis of written studies examining and 
analyzing mitigation steps and policy measures taken before, during, and post-disaster, actions 
taken to improve recovery and resilience outcomes, and efforts to ensure all members of a 
community are included in future planning activities and decision making about such threats. We 
examine available literature that addresses the challenges and prospects for community recovery 
concerning natural disasters, specifically hurricane-related events. We will seek to understand the 
response and recovery process for communities that have been affected by severe flooding. This 
capstone project will also examine actions taken by communities that have experienced similar 
flooding disasters to determine best practices the City of Wharton, and other Texas cities, can use 
to better prepare for such disasters and recover from them in the future. In addition to evaluating 
best practices repeated in the literature, it is also important to understand the different effects 
disasters can have on communities across citizen socio-economic differences.  
Understanding factors that contribute to specific groups experiencing higher vulnerability 
than others during the actual emergency and into the recovery process is a key area of analysis in 
working to understand how disasters affect communities.  
2. Who is Vulnerable and Why 
2.1 Social Vulnerability  
Social vulnerability describes the socioeconomic features of a community including 
characteristics such as race/ethnicity, income, education, and housing capacity that can affect the 
ability of a population to withstand environmental threats and build resilience against the effects 
of potential hazards (Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014; Peacock et. al., 2015; Mitsova et. 
al., 2019). While efforts to improve disaster assessment and mitigation capabilities have 
incorporated the physical aspects of critical infrastructure as a potential source of vulnerability, 
Flanagan et. al. (2011) argue the role of social characteristics have been overlooked in describing 
community vulnerability and, thus, have not been addressed by practitioners (Flanagan et al., 2011; 
Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014). Social vulnerability can be explained as a function of 
"unequal exposure to risk coupled with unequal access to resources," as different levels of 
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capability within a community affect the severity of damage experienced and the overall timeline 
of disaster recovery efforts (Mitsova et al., 2019; Rumbach, Makarewicz, & Németh, 2015).  
In recognizing the effects of social vulnerability on recovery and resilience, understanding 
which populations are vulnerable and factors that contribute to such experiences serve to increase 
overall awareness and improve future recovery operations and perceptions of government 
responsiveness. Across the literature examined on risk and vulnerability affecting recovery, 
research findings identify low-income populations as having fewer resources to recover following 
a natural disaster, and the severity of damage experienced in these communities is typically higher 
than areas with more resources (Masozera et al., 2006; Zhang & Peacock, 2009). In a study 
examining the effects of Hurricane Irma on central and south Florida communities’ ability to 
recover, Mitsova et. al. (2019) found elderly individuals together with minority groups including 
Black/African Americans and Hispanic/Latino populations as experiencing a prolonged recovery 
when compared to the results and recovery outcomes of White populations.     
In addition to demographic characteristics, social vulnerability includes financial factors 
such as income and purchasing power when considering decision-making in regards to flood 
insurance and other disaster preparedness behaviors affecting community resilience. In the 
aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, it was reported that only 17 percent of homeowners in locations 
that were hit hardest by the storm had purchased flood insurance (Mitsova et al., 2019; Long, 
2017). Despite over 80 percent of homeowners significantly affected by Harvey not having 
purchased flood insurance, Kousky (2017) emphasizes such security is of value for low to 
moderate income residents who would otherwise be less capable of making large personal 
payments to go towards damage expenses. In recognizing the value of flood insurance, Mitsova et 
al. (2019) found that low-income residents are frequently without coverage and are most likely to 
experience vulnerability in terms of potential damage and lack of overall protection from losses 
sustained in the event of an incident or natural disaster.     
2.2 Physical Vulnerability  
 Improving the physical capabilities of critical infrastructure and working to reduce the 
consequences of current damage is often a primary consideration when addressing immediate 
vulnerabilities and determining emergency response efforts. Physical characteristics of structures 
include the "roof, foundation, exterior materials, and building standards," as such external features 
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can work to describe the severity of a natural disaster and provide a general idea of observed effects 
and overall monetary damage experienced (Mitsova et al., 2019; Highfield, Peacock & Van Zandt, 
2014 p. 290).  
Factors that influence vulnerability include the quality of public housing structures, as units 
are often built in vulnerable areas within a community, and as a result, low-income populations 
living in such housing are more likely to experience the most significant damage and maintain the 
slowest ability to recover (Tran, 2013). In working to understand why low-income and minority 
populations experience the severity of damage at a higher impact, Peacock et al. (2015) underline 
the physical characteristics of such neighborhoods and how community perceptions of desirability 
have historically affected and shaped investment and improvement decisions. Features of homes 
typically occupied by low-income and minority residents include being "built to older, less-
stringent building codes, used lower-quality designs and construction materials, and were less well 
maintained," also, for economic reasons, located in less desirable and more vulnerable areas, as 
such factors contribute to overall lower neighborhood resilience (Peacock et al., 2015, p. 357). In 
assessing the relationship between damage and appraisal value, Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt 
(2014) found homes experiencing less damage were associated with a higher overall value as 
neighborhoods which observed significant damage were those primarily comprised of Hispanic 
and African American populations (Peacock et al., 2015).  
2.3 Locational Vulnerability 
When analyzing the role of the physical environment in the aftermath of a natural disaster, 
researchers have argued that flooding in many areas was the result of wetland alteration and 
topography destruction and change (Brody et al., 2008). Additional findings contend that location 
in terms of living next to a body of water or in a flood plain dramatically increases the possibility 
of a home flooding and experiencing related damage (Brody, 2015). Rumbach, Makarewicz, and 
Neméth (2015) examine the role of location in the context of disaster recovery following the 2013 
Colorado floods and contend that attributes of location including physical and local government 
factors affect overall risk exposure and hazard vulnerability.  
Location affects the level of susceptibility a community can experience, as the position of 
a home or neighborhood effects mitigation and recovery efforts. Consistent with vulnerability, 
location can work to determine where a hazardous incident or potential damage could reasonably 
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occur based on projected risk and exposure (Rumbach, Makarewicz, and Neméth, 2015). In 
responding to a natural disaster, location can also direct which level of government has the 
appropriate capability to engage in planning and recovery operations. Decision-making in regards 
to planning and navigating rebuilding opportunities is primarily the decision of local government 
officials and can affect immediate emergency action and long-term future recovery operations 
(Rumbach, Makarewicz, & Neméth, 2015). Local government authority and development 
priorities affecting exposure to risk have periodically allowed the building of housing and 
additional community development activities in flood-prone areas, thus exacerbating community 
vulnerability by increasing the probability the region will experience flooding (Burby, 2006). This 
represents another reason to examine the role of locational vulnerability in prioritizing and 
communicating risk when considering economic and community development opportunities.  
3. Problems Encountered by Local Communities 
In analyzing issues experienced by communities, the disaster management cycle describes 
natural disaster and the management practices that follow as a continuum of interlinked activities 
encountered during mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Carter, 2008; FEMA, 2013). 
The purpose of the disaster management cycle serves to identify goals and responsibilities of 
government decision-makers and response officials in avoiding or reducing potential losses from 
hazards, providing timely and appropriate assistance to disaster victims, and achieving rapid and 
effective recovery operations (Carter, 2008). However, the ongoing process by which 
governments, non-profit organizations, private stakeholders, and the public, in general, react 
before, during and following a natural disaster is confronted with challenges that arise throughout 
each stage of response and recovery (Global Development Research Center, n.d.).  
3.1 Before 
Citizen engagement, participation, and involvement across the community is essential for 
a successful planning process, for it is important to have citizen buy-in on mitigation efforts and 
expenditures. One of the primary obstacles communities experience before a natural disaster 
occurs is the lack of community input gathered during mitigation and recovery planning. Public 
and community engagement opportunities in the planning process have been found to be minimal 
for some groups and nonexistent for others (Brody, Godschalk, & Burby, 2003). For a community 
to adequately prepare and recover from natural disasters, public involvement and engagement 
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throughout each phase of the disaster management cycle is a critical component of responsiveness 
(Carter, 2008). Researchers have also found that a lack of public involvement in the planning 
process can negatively affect government preparedness, responsiveness, and representative 
functions. Participation rates among minority groups, the elderly, and disabled citizens are 
particularly low, which creates a significant challenge for the community and local officials in 
working to bring as many members of the community together to participate in productive 
planning discussions and mitigation activities (Priestley & Hemingway, 2007; Center for 
Community Health and Development, 2018).  
In addition to citizen engagement during planning, hazard mitigation actions are another 
factor used to measure a community’s ability to endure and recover from a weather-related 
disaster. Although residents can be aware of the benefits of hazard mitigation, action presents a 
challenging context for local government officials when community willingness-to-pay creates a 
barrier for actual implementation of the infrastructure improvements necessary to support 
mitigation (Bichard & Kazmierczak, 2010). Moreover, convincing community members to spend 
money to mitigate risks and address vulnerabilities is also a challenge that many local officials 
experience as managing risks associated with natural disasters are dependent not only on physical 
conditions and events but also on human actions, decisions, and cultural characteristics (Eiser et 
al., 2012).  
Overall actions identified within the literature affecting local governments, businesses, and 
citizens in reducing the adverse effects of flooding and guiding the recovery process include 
protective zoning, land use planning, and the construction of flood protection infrastructures. In 
addition, constructing more and larger storm drains and developing building codes that require 
homes to have higher elevations, and deeper foundations can improve mitigation practices and 
increase community resilience (Kennedy et al., 2011). Such improvements, however, can be 
expensive and not always favored by local residents and taxpayers. 
3.2 During 
Even when a community has preparedness plans in place, actual crisis management during 
a natural disaster does not always align with identified policies and procedures (Quarantelli, 1988). 
Some of the key management problems communities experience refers to the communication and 
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coordination process (Quarantelli, 1988). Challenges, therefore, represent the importance of such 
factors consistent with providing an efficient and effective response during a natural disaster.  
Difficulties observed in the communication process can be exacerbated when considering 
the uncertainty surrounding community perceptions of risk. In examining local jurisdictions and 
community perceptions of protection efforts and policy, areas can react differently to evacuation 
orders, as regions within different sub-sectors develop a varied response to government directives 
and emergency notifications (Dixon et al., 2017). Different community perceptions of risk 
affecting the willingness or hesitancy of residents to evacuate impose a challenge for local 
government and emergency officials when working to protect residents (Weller, Baer, & 
Prochaska, 2016). Research findings maintain general community knowledge about hurricanes and 
hurricane safety is unrelated to evacuation; however, the belief that one's own home is subject to 
flooding strongly correlates with whether the occupant decides to leave or not (Baker, 1991). When 
an evacuation order is issued, 30 to 40 percent of residents in official evacuation zones fail to 
evacuate (Weller et al., 2016). In the case of Hurricane Floyd in 1999, traffic congestion problems 
factored heavily into the decision-making process for residents to evacuate from coastal areas 
(Dow & Cutter, 2002). Mass evacuations from Florida created heavy traffic congestion along 
South Carolina evacuation routes ultimately deterring residents from evacuating (Dow & Cutter, 
2002). 
 In addition to mass evacuations, shadow evacuations (evacuations from people not under 
mandatory evacuation) also contributed to traffic congestion experienced in the area. Not only 
were shadow evacuations a problem for local response operations in terms of experiencing 
increased levels of traffic, but the lack of communication across government and community actors 
to citizens also created coordination challenges. Rather than evacuating inland, residents along the 
Atlantic coast of the U. S. evacuated northward, congesting highways and leaving many people 
stranded on the road. This lack of coordination extended to a miscommunication among residents, 
and thus, intensified traffic congestion (Wolshon, Urbina, Wilmot, & Levitan, 2005). Additional 
examples to convey the challenges of evacuation and other protection-related policies include a 
study of Galveston, Texas. Findings from Weller, et al. (2016) examined local resident decision-
making during Hurricane Ike. Of the people surveyed, the number one reason given by residents 
who decided to stay in their homes was the fear of being stuck in traffic while attempting to 
evacuate (Weller et al., 2016). 
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Communication problems have also been shown to occur due to a lack of clarity regarding 
roles and responsibilities among organizations working in disaster-related capacities. Conflict 
regarding such authority over decision-making and jurisdictional differences across organizations 
can affect and even reduce efforts made during emergency response (Quarantelli, 1988). Such 
effects were identified during Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, where a lack of communication 
between government officials, agencies, and recovery organizations exacerbated the overall effects 
of the disaster (Olshanksy et al., 2008).    
Consistent with communication, Burby (2006) presents the lack of coordination as the local 
government paradox; that is, while residents bear the burden of human suffering and financial loss 
following a natural disaster, local officials often do not have sufficient resources or established 
plans in place to address community vulnerability. In examining how governments across sectors 
respond to natural disasters, The Report of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs (2006) issued findings in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. In responding 
to the natural disaster, government officials at all levels did not fully comprehend Hurricane 
Katrina’s devastating potential to create immense damage. This lack of understanding by 
government officials led to an “undermining of confidence in our government's’ ability to plan, 
prepare for, and respond to national catastrophes” (The Report of the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006, p. 2). Similar to the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Report, the Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate 
the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina U.S. House of Representatives (2006) 
presented findings concluding the lack of response planning and flexibility across levels of 
government can contribute to such negative effects following a natural disaster.  
4. Recovery Following Natural Disaster 
During post-disaster recovery, decision-makers across levels of government concentrate 
efforts to rapidly reduce risk, engage in the protection and rebuilding of critical infrastructure and 
work to restore daily operations throughout affected communities (Ingram et al., 2006). In 
analyzing factors that affect community recovery, research finds the response process following a 
natural disaster is typically quick, but short-lived. While communities usually come together in 
the aftermath of an emergency or devastating event, such sentiments of unity often do not continue 
throughout the recovery process (Moore et al., 2004). As a result, such attitudes may affect the 
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ability of local governments to provide adequate recovery operations and complete mitigation 
efforts to increase community resilience.  
Despite the pressure to urgently address complex situations and difficult decisions, such 
immediacy of actions can result in inadequate policies that can potentially increase long-term 
vulnerabilities of affected populations. In this context, it is important to identify suitable strategies 
to address recovery, ensuring an adequate balance between short and long-term community efforts 
(Ingram et al., 2006). Although the role of government is a central factor, the response process is 
the responsibility of multiple actors within a community. As a result, residents and families, private 
business stakeholders, non-profit organizations, and officials across levels of government all have 
a role in achieving successful response outcomes. Consistent with the response time period, local 
recovery efforts account for all stakeholders within a community, as each entity works to create 
and identify goals for improving mitigation performance and completing reconstruction priorities 
(Olshansky & Johnson, 2014). One of the primary goals of governments in navigating the recovery 
process is to have the capabilities to transition from short-term response and recovery to long-term 
planning and improvements while still engaging key stakeholders and community members 
(Ingram et al., 2006; Olshansky & Johnson, 2014).  
4.1 Short-Term Assistance  
The short-term recovery process provides the immediate extension of resources for the 
purpose of relieving disaster-affected communities, restoring critical infrastructure services, and 
securing essential community functions (Government Accountability Office, 2008). To provide an 
adequate source of relief, the role of short-term recovery policies and efforts serve to minimize the 
time between living in a disaster zone and returning a community to a sense of normalcy (Ingram 
et al., 2006). In addition, effective short-term recovery planning will serve to transition a 
community into the long-term recovery process and future disaster planning considerations. In 
working to achieve adequate response operations and move into long-term recovery, local officials 
and stakeholders often feel pressured by community members to identify the fastest possible route 
to normalcy. However, by doing so, valuable time and resources can be misallocated affecting the 
success of planning and mitigation efforts and creating potential consequences for resilience in the 
event of future disasters (Hamideh, 2015).  
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4.1.1 Community Networks & Involvement 
 Civic engagement and involvement represent an important role within the disaster 
planning, response, and recovery process, as these communities can recover faster than those who 
do not have the same level of networks and connections (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). Following a 
natural disaster, feelings of a “common experience” are often prevalent among community 
members and can even work to overshadow prior class divisions (Richardson et al., 2014). The 
effects of active community engagement has been well documented in the post-disaster literature. 
After a series of tornadoes struck rural southern Indiana in 2012, researchers examined the speed 
at which communities were able to recover. Evidence found that strong citizen engagement 
observed in the planning and recovery process aided in the rate at which families and homes 
recovered (Sadri et al., 2016).  
While community engagement represents an important factor affecting community 
recovery, involvement in specific situations has the potential to overpower or impede the recovery 
and mitigation planning process. While it rarely occurs, an oversaturation of unorganized 
community engagement has been shown to negatively affect and obstruct the community recovery 
timeline. This situation happened in Galveston in 2008 when a large number of citizens tried to 
participate in recovery planning efforts for housing on the island (Hamideh, 2015). This example 
represents the importance of organized civic and community engagements in the local government 
planning process to include residents while working to conduct effective recovery actions. 
The ability of local governments to organize recovery planning and facilitate involvement 
opportunities is often determined by the capabilities and resources available to a community 
(Patterson et al., 2009). Lack of organizational capacity for local governments to effectively 
engage in planning also represents a significant factor negatively affecting the ability to address 
short-term recovery from natural disasters (Webb, Tierney, & Dahlhamer, 2002; Burby, 2006). 
Capacity describes the ability of local government agencies and officials to achieve recovery goals 
and objectives and reflects the level of fiscal and human resources administrators have to perform 
related tasks and responsibilities (Krouse & Woods, 2014). Increased organizational capacity can 
allow for local governments and communities to be better able to coordinate response efforts using 
available resources and address the needs of community members severely affected by the disaster 
(Comfort, 1990). In working to maximize capacity, smaller governments who lack fiscal and 
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operational resources can implement low-cost response strategies that address community need 
while taking into account available funding and assistance opportunities. In addition, mutual aid 
agreements with neighboring cities, counties, and non-profit organizations to address response and 
recovery are used within the State of Texas (Texas Department of Emergency Management, 2019).  
4.1.2 Infrastructure and Housing  
Consistent with previously discussed factors in the recovery process, communities 
experience several challenges regarding the protection of critical infrastructure and repairing 
physical housing, government, education, and business structures. Short-term disaster recovery 
generally focuses on residents and businesses who can insure property and related assets (Peacock, 
Dash, & Zhang, 2007). As a result, this focus can intensify the mistrust individuals in poverty and 
other marginalized groups who do not have the financial ability to insure or participate in coverage 
programs tend to have towards government (Boix & Posner, 1998).  
An additional problem communities experience within the recovery process is the question 
of simply repairing existing structures as opposed to investing in long-term capital improvements 
(Olshansky & Johnson, 2014). While immediate surface repairs of housing and infrastructure 
without long-term improvements is a cheaper alternative for governments and communities, such 
actions do not necessarily address underlying community vulnerabilities. In addition, while 
policies and programs that work to replace lost housing structures can provide immediate 
accommodations, such actions can often leave families vulnerable to experience damage during 
future natural disasters. Consistent with challenges that affect recovery investments, individuals 
often do not make necessary home repairs following appraisals from FEMA despite being awarded 
grants to fund specific projects.2 As a result, in subsequent disasters, these residents are often not 
eligible for additional relief and recovery assistance (Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014). This cycle is 
referred to as the Natural Disaster Syndrome; where people do not take actions because their 
perceptions of risk are not aligned with true risk or experience budget constraints which prevent 
them from employing mitigation strategies. 
In working to address community vulnerability and increase neighborhood resilience, 
research findings indicate communities that develop comprehensive redevelopment policies to 
                                               
2 Requirements to apply for FEMA grants include being a homeowner and having flood insurance for housing 
assistance. 
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improve current and future housing capacity aid long-term community recovery (Ingram et. al. 
2006; Berke et. al., 2014) As in the case with Galveston, Texas after Hurricane Ike, housing 
recovery was a significant problem experienced within the community (Hamideh, 2015). In 
Galveston, the lack of comprehensive planning created problems specifically for low and 
moderate-income residents working to recover from the storm. Following a rushed recovery 
planning process, only minimal mitigation improvements were able to be achieved as a result of 
coordinating immediate rebuilding activities with insufficient community and financial resources 
(Hamideh, 2015). In the long-term, this prevented many homes in Galveston from recovering to 
pre-Hurricane Ike conditions and prolonged the recovery process a year longer than the average 
housing recovery timeline of two to three years (Hamideh, 2015).  
To reduce community risk and address vulnerabilities, infrastructure improvements such 
as bridges, levees, and dams require sufficient resources, effective planning and mitigation 
strategies, and the continued investment and commitment of multiple agency actors (Olshansky & 
Johnson, 2014). Such infrastructure improvements, however, are time-consuming and if 
improperly planned can create long-term recovery issues for a community (Olshansky & Johnson, 
2014; Hamideh, 2015). An example of this was experienced in the City of New Orleans, where 
ineffective government action for recovery planning and coordination had both immediate and 
long-term consequences for recovery outcomes post-Hurricane Katrina (Olshansky & Johnson, 
2014). In addition, improper planning can also lead officials and stakeholders to identify goals and 
objectives that do not align with desired outcomes and misuse resources intended for recovery 
operations (Hamideh, 2015). As illustrated by the experiences of other communities, coordinating 
a rushed recovery process to achieve a state of normalcy often does not work in decreasing 
vulnerabilities and can increase potential risk (Olshansky & Johnson, 2014; Berke et al., 2014). 
To improve the mitigation planning process, local government action includes creating proposals 
that are substantive and cost-effective to promote and advance rebuilding efforts. In working to 
prevent and reduce the effects of natural disasters, and recover from them as quickly as possible, 
appropriate planning actions represent a core element of any viable recovery framework.  
4.2 Long-Term Planning and Recovery  
In planning for recovery, factors including plan quality, stakeholder involvement, optimal 
design, and funding allocations work to determine the effectiveness and success of community 
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efforts (Berke et al., 2014; Olshansky & Johnson, 2014; Eid & El-adaway, 2018). Consistent with 
other objectives affecting resilience, research findings indicate recovery plans can contribute to 
higher levels of community vulnerability if actions do not work to improve public infrastructure 
and address social, environmental, and economic concerns (Eid & El-adaway, 2018). Multi-agency 
coordination, community engagement, and strong policies are essential in achieving long-term 
disaster recovery, hence it is important to ensure resources and planning functions are directed 
towards completing long-term goals and objectives (Ingram et al., 2006). Research findings 
indicate long-term disaster recovery is not the exclusive task of a single community actor but rather 
a coordinated effort across planners, agencies, and stakeholders. In analyzing the effects of such 
coordination, similar recovery goals and mitigation practices reinforced by how many actors 
participate in the recovery process was shown to influence the speed of a community's ability to 
"bounce back" following a natural disaster (Ingram et al., 2006; Hamideh, 2015).  
Economic recovery provides an essential security function for affected communities. As a 
result, it is critical for community actors, government officials, and planning professionals to 
understand the economic base and primary areas of employment in their jurisdiction when creating 
disaster preparedness plans and implementing recovery actions (Lindell & Prater, 2003). Planning 
is not a task that is limited exclusively to local governments officials. Business and development 
opportunities serve an essential role in supporting the local economy of a community (Runyan, 
2006). In examining economic recovery post-disaster, one of the primary reasons found by 
researchers regarding the slow recovery of small businesses is the lack of sufficient planning. 
Factors significant to recovery efforts include the ability of local businesses to survive the disaster 
and return to normal business operations quickly (Runyan, 2006). The importance of planning 
activity extends to business recovery, as research findings indicate small businesses that engage in 
planning for the potential effects of a natural disaster tend to be more successful in the immediate 
response and recovery process than those which do not engage in planning (Runyan, 2006). 
Ensuring small businesses have plans in the event of an absence of cash flow, lack of government 
assistance and infrastructure damages or destruction is a key aspect of providing businesses can 
stay in the area following a disaster (Runyan, 2006). A study conducted by Webb, Tierney, and 
Dahlhamer (2002) in California examined long-term recovery of businesses following natural 
disasters and found that several factors affect the ability of businesses to remain open and 
profitable. The sector in which the business operates, the age of the business, and financial assets 
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are among the factors that affect resilience throughout the local business community (Webb, 
Tierney, & Dahlhamer, 2002).  
In identifying specific communities affected by natural disasters, businesses within the City 
of New Orleans experienced difficulty in resuming operations following the devastation caused by 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. A study on local business operations in hurricane-affected areas found 
businesses that had developed emergency plans recovered more effectively after Hurricane 
Katrina. Planning features including physically preparing the building (i.e. boarding windows), 
establishing emergency contact information for employees such as alternative email accounts and 
cell phone numbers, arranging long-distance operations, and purchasing adequate flood insurance 
policies were all found to be effective techniques businesses can use to prepare for and recover 
after a major event (Corey, Deitch, 2011). 
Natural disasters not only affect property recovery but may also affect the mental well-
being of communities, families, and individuals directly impacted (Green & Solomon, 1995) for 
extended periods after a disaster. In assessing the effects of disaster-related events on mental 
health, an estimated 50 percent of people in the direct path of a hurricane develop post-traumatic 
stress disorder as well as anxiety disorders (Shultz & Galea, 2017). Supplementary research 
estimates PTSD rates are much lower but still acknowledge this affect as a valid medical concern 
following natural disasters. Six months after Hurricane Andrew, an estimated 15 percent of White 
populations and 38 percent of Hispanic populations experienced PTSD (Perilla, Norris, & Lavizzo, 
2002). The availability of mental health services is not always guaranteed, especially in small 
communities. Thus, working with nonprofit organizations to provide mental health resources as 
part of the long-term recovery process can work to increase the organizational capacity of local 
communities in providing important services which would not have been available otherwise 
(Berke & Campanella, 2006).  
 In examining the role of long-term planning in natural disaster recovery, understanding 
how local governments navigate best practice strategies and techniques will provide a context 
throughout our research, analysis, and final recommendations for the City of Wharton.  
5. Best Practices  
 In analyzing strategies communities can take to protect residents from the effects of natural 
disaster, the literature maintains one plan or policy that would fit all instances of community 
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recovery are inefficient. Often, the most effective mitigation and recovery plans are designed to 
identify and tailor risk management procedures to the needs and vulnerabilities of each 
geographical region to allow for the achievement of safety goals and security measures for each 
community (Dixon et al., 2017). While communities can enact a variety of best practices during 
the recovery process, this literature review will focus on home buyout programs and building codes 
as such programs and standards have been identified as viable options toward mitigation planning.   
5.1 Home Buyout Programs 
Within the preparedness and recovery framework, there are many mitigation tools and 
policies defined within the literature to limit the potential negative effects of a natural disaster. 
One specific type of program which has gained increasing popularity in the United States is the 
home buyout. Although home buyouts are often associated with being an expensive policy option, 
such programs can also serve to save money and permanently remove citizens from dangerous 
environmental situations (Binder & Greer, 2016). Additionally, home buyouts represent a useful 
policy alternative by physically relocating families to higher ground and re-establishing 
floodplains toward their natural function of storm-water storage. Historically, home-buyout 
programs have not been used in the United States as a type of hazard mitigation or recovery 
practice in flood-prone or hazardous areas. The first time this type of program was implemented 
on a full-scale was after the 1993 Midwest floods (which will be discussed more as part of the case 
studies) which resulted in over $3 billion of damage (FEMA, 2003). This flooding event was the 
first time FEMA included buyout programs as a valid use of the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
(HMGP) funds. Such a decision represents an important recognition by the federal government of 
the potential effectiveness of a home buyout program. As a result, $200 million was allocated 
specifically for buying homes following this disaster and created a precedent for federal dollars to 
be used for this type of mitigation activity in the future.   
In adopting a home buyout program, this type of policy option is used to encourage 
permanent relocation from an area deemed unsafe or hazardous (FEMA, 2008). In most cases, a 
cost-benefit analysis is conducted to help determine which homes are selected. However, Binder, 
et al. (2015) emphasizes the cultural and historical context of the community and the characteristics 
of the geographical area should also be considered throughout the home buyout process (Binder, 
Baker, & Barlie, 2015). A home buyout program requires intergovernmental cooperation across 
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federal, state, and local government officials in working to negotiate the purchase of homes and 
land from private owners. The role of planning and implementation of this program is the 
responsibility of the local level and is funded through two primary federal sources: FEMA and 
HUD (Tate, Strong, Kraus, & Xiong, 2015). Both programs require geographic locations to have 
been under a Presidentially Declared Disaster to qualify for funding. However, differences exist 
between the requirements for issuing funding assistance. 
Home buyout programs are categorized under FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
(HMGP). While FEMA does not specify the implementation of the actual buyout, guidelines have 
been developed for participation in the program (FEMA, 2008):  
● Homes must not be purchased directly, but the land on which they reside. 
● Purchased land can be used as a trust or open space 
● The buyout program must be voluntary 
● Owners must be provided the fair market, the pre-disaster price for their property 
● Property purchased must be maintained  
● No duplicate benefits may be given for homeowners 
Federal assistance for buyout programs is also available to state and local governments 
through The Department of Housing and Urban Development Community Development Block 
Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) funding. It is also indicated that upon applying for such 
assistance that all of the above HMGP criteria be met to receive CDBG-DR funding. Contrary to 
HMGP funding, state and local entities can apply for this grant and use it along with HMGP 
projects. While such assistance is available, CDBG-DR funding is intended to be a “last funding 
source,” and because of this, it can be used to match funding from different sources to complete a 
community project (HUD, 2012). 
5.2 Zoning and Building Codes 
  To mitigate risk, such as those associated with increased levels of heavy rainfall, there are 
several actions local governments, businesses, and citizens can take to reduce the adverse effects 
of flooding and strengthen recovery. These actions range from protective zoning and land use 
planning to effective implementation of building codes. Some specific policies which mandate 
land use practices and building code standards have been incorporated as traditional hazard 
mitigation practices. Such policies specify where community development can occur and 
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processes for implementation, thus decreasing the likelihood of damage or loss of life in the event 
of a disaster (Aerts & Botzen, 2011). In examining community practices around the world, the 
International Code Council (ICC) standards exist to outline the types of buildings which can be 
built and the materials which can be used for construction. Despite the enactment of code councils, 
there is no internationally accepted standard for land use practices. Research has shown that 
enacting stricter policies on floodplain development could reduce the economic burden following 
a disaster (Albright & Crow, 2015; Aerts & Botzen, 2011). While achieving a high level of 
effectiveness once adopted, such policies require extensive coordination between local 
government actors and FEMA officials to ensure highly impactful results which can often be 
difficult to achieve (Aerts & Botzen, 2011).  
In examining the effects of strict zoning laws and building codes including the prevention 
of building in environmentally sensitive areas that act as a flood buffer, research findings indicate 
such actions can be effective in reducing community vulnerability. The enactment and 
enforcement of zoning and building codes which go beyond ICC standards fall under the 
regulatory power of local jurisdictions (Beuchert, 1963). Therefore, it is essential to ensure 
communities have the organizational capacity to enforce building standards and development 
requirements (Godschalk, 2003). In regulating land-use development, such policy actions, 
however, are not always popular within the business and broader local community and can be 
challenging to implement.  
Building codes and land use zoning are not only useful in guiding the construction of new 
projects, as such policies can also serve as an effective tool to improve the resilience of existing 
physical structures (Aerts & Botzen, 2011). It may be necessary to enact mitigation policies 
through building codes (Kunreuther, 2006). When addressing the vulnerability of buildings 
previously constructed in hazardous areas, it is often difficult to remove the structure entirely from 
experiencing potential damage. In working to increase resilience, the policy of building codes can 
be strengthened to incorporate not only new developments but also those which currently exist to 
achieve overall structural improvements. 
6. The Importance of This Literature Review  
 In the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, local communities like the City of Wharton have 
experienced challenges that are similar to problems faced by other communities. Throughout this 
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literature review, such challenges have been addressed along with actions, strategies, and policies 
communities can implement to improve recovery outcomes and strengthen local resilience. To 
effectively take action and support recovery operations, it is imperative community leaders and 
residents understand vulnerabilities within their area, use available resources effectively, and learn 
from the actions of other communities to determine recovery operations that could potentially be 
successful for future response efforts.  
This literature review has provided an initial overview of research to provide local officials 
best practices in moving forward in the recovery process and to ensure the City of Wharton is more 
resilient for future events. As this report continues, case study analysis and stakeholder interviews 
will provide insight on mitigation planning and recovery measures to increase preparedness and 
overall resilience. 
31 
Case Study #1: The Great Midwest Flood, 1993 
Introduction 
As urbanization, changing climates, and the Earth’s population continue to increase, 
natural disasters have become prevalent across the United States and around the world. In 
examining specific analyses of communities that have recently faced similar challenges and 
experiences, leaders and citizens can learn from different problems and opportunities and work to 
better prepare for, recover from, and mitigate the damage of future disasters. This case study will 
examine the natural disaster event of The Great Midwest Flood of 1993 (particularly the twin cities 
of Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas), in addition to identifying successful outcomes, 
problems the community encountered, and overall lessons learned to provide insight to the City of 
Wharton on how to increase preparedness and overall resilience for future hurricanes and potential 
flooding events.  
Background of the Flood 
The Great Midwest Flood of 1993 was a natural disaster event without precedent in modern 
US history. The late summer and winter of 1992 were wetter seasons than normal in the Midwest 
region, and this precipitation combined with cooler temperatures produced extremely wet soil 
conditions. Increasingly heavy rainfall throughout the spring, summer, and early fall months of 
1993 set record-breaking rainfall amounts in all nine states affected by the floods. In early summer, 
the intense and near continuous rainfall coupled with wet soil conditions began to fill streams and 
channels throughout the region, creating record flows on many tributaries of the Missouri and 
Mississippi rivers (Galloway, 1995). The flooding eventually pushed the Mississippi River to a 
crest in St. Louis on July 12th, 1993 of 43 feet, equivalent to the previous record (Leavesley, 1997).  
In late July, heavy rainfall began in North Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri. These rains 
produced record flooding on the Missouri River, which crested in Kansas City, MO at 48.9 feet, 
setting a new record (Leavesley, 1997). The record flow of the Missouri River joined the already 
full Mississippi River at St. Louis and pushed the river to another record crest of 49.47 feet on 
August 1st, 1993 (Leavesley, 1997). This level remains the record to date. 
The Great Midwest Flood created unique challenges for the region. The widespread 
flooding event covered a total of nine states and spanned 400,000 miles. Fifty deaths can be 
attributed to the flooding and over 1,000 levees were topped or failed. The flood was also 
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extremely long in duration, lasting 200 days in some locations (Leavesley, 1997). Additionally, 
the flood caused extensive financial costs to the nation. Fiscal damages ranged from $12 billion to 
$16 billion, with $6 billion committed to flood response and recovery operations (Galloway, 
1995). As a result, over 100,000 homes experienced physical damage along with the unquantifiable 
emotional effects on the physical and mental health of the community (Galloway, 1995).  
Recovery- The Importance of Funding 
Specific to the Kansas City, Missouri region, recovery efforts have spanned 25 years. The 
progress Kansas City has made in regards to recovery after the 1993 flood is in large part due to 
the community’s collaboration and overall efforts to lobby for federal funding to prevent the 
effects of another natural disaster (Fox, 2018). In 2018, Congress approved an additional $17.4 
billion in funding for levees and flood control - including $453 million for the Kansas City Levees 
project along the Missouri River. The levees will run along the Kansas and Missouri rivers for 
over 60 miles and will work to protect $20 billion in infrastructure and 20,000 residents (Fox, 
2018). Following the completion of this project, the levees will serve to be a reliable tool for 
preventing future flooding from the Kansas River Basin (Fox, 2018). Two new levee projects have 
already been constructed since the 1993 floods, bringing Kansas City’s levee total to nine. With 
the two additional levees and the Kansas City, Kansas Levee project underway, city officials are 
hopeful they will never have to confront extensive rebuilding again (Nelson, 2018).  
 Money allocated to support the recovery of businesses and homes from the federal 
government was crucial to the successful recovery of the Kansas City area following the Great 
Midwest Flood. Neighborhood homes and private businesses in the Kansas City area were severely 
damaged by the flooding. The effect of such damage was highlighted by data from the Disaster 
Housing Assistance program, which found at least 100,000 residences had been flooded (US 
FEMA, 1994). Surveys distributed by local Red Cross workers immediately after the flood 
occurred identified more than 55,000 flooded residences with the estimate updated following 
FEMA’s own reports to 70,545 residences (Galloway, 1995). By April of 1994, the federal 
government had received 16,224 registrations for individual assistance and 112,042 applications 
for the Disaster Housing Program. A total of 90,000 applications were approved for residents to 
receive funding from the federal government, affording such recipients a new home following the 
disaster (Galloway, 1995). 
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In addition to housing assistance, money from the federal government played a critical role 
in the recovery of businesses across the region. Much of the damages to businesses in Kansas City, 
Missouri occurred due to the failure of several levee systems (Galloway, 1995). Payments made 
to small businesses from the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and Small Business 
Administration (SBA) indicate over 5,000 businesses were damaged by the floods (US FEMA, 
1994). In working to promote small business recovery, SBA loans to businesses exceeded $334 
million to address physical and economic damage experienced in the region (Kulik, 1994). 
Coupled with $94 million in loans from the NFIP given to address small business and other non-
residential building needs, the total amount of federal funding spent in an effort to engage local 
businesses in recovery exceeds $431 million (FEMA, 2014). In working to understand the recovery 
process of the Midwest region following the 1993 flooding event, it is important to address best 
practice and overall challenges faced by these communities that affected response and emergency 
actions.    
Best Practices & Challenges 
Communication 
Prior to the event, region officials were able to effectively notify citizens of the oncoming 
dangers, protect human life, and secure physical property. Over 1,000 flood warnings and 
statements-five times the normal amount, were issued to warn the public and the appropriate 
officials of the high river levels (NOAA, 2018). Although there were successful outcomes 
experienced in the region, several areas of communication proved to be challenging during the 
flooding. For example, information issued on the ongoing flood conditions and the recovery 
process was often incomplete or not timely. In addition, estimates reported on losses were 
generally inaccurate for a considerable period of time after the floods (Changnon, 2005). 
Furthermore, an unclear definition of the division of responsibilities for floodplain management 
among federal, state, and local government officials created communication and coordination 
problems.  
The role of each level of government in floodplain management can work to describe the 
challenges experienced in the region. State governments have limited fiscal stake in floodplain 
management, resulting in a lack of incentives for involvement and participation in this process 
(Galloway, 1995). Federal agencies, therefore, generally are associated with the primary role of 
34 
floodplain management, but it became clear after the 1993 floods there were several examples of 
state non-compliance with federal floodplain management requirements. While state agencies 
believed federal agencies were complying with such requirements, a lack of communication 
between the two levels of governments and confusion from the 1977 Floodplain Management 
Executive Order led to a Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funded low-
income housing project and a federal state prison to be built within vulnerable floodplains 
(Galloway, 1995).  
Acquisition/Buyout Programs 
 Following the 1993 flooding event, Kansas City, Missouri was able to obtain financial 
support from FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) and the HUD Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program. Subsequently, such funding has helped the Kansas 
City community take measures to effectively mitigate damage from future floods (FEMA, 2011). 
Kansas City received $1.3 million from the federal government to purchase homes from residents 
who wanted to move out of the floodplain and used the funding assistance to purchase 61 
residential properties. In working to reduce the risks associated with living in or around a 
floodplain, residential structures were cleared and wildlife was returned to inhabit the area. Kansas 
City officials realized the important policy tool of land use regulation and used the 1993 floods as 
an opportunity to correct long-standing environmental problems and update inadequate policies. 
As a result of increased resilience, when Kansas City experienced flash flooding again in 1998, 
the community was not heavily affected. Overall, minimal damage occurred and high costs 
associated with response and recovery, including warning alerts, evacuation procedures, and 
rescue operations were avoided. In identifying potential outcomes, all 61 structures that had been 
removed from the floodplain after the Great Midwest Flood would have likely experienced 
flooding and received extensive damage in 1998 in the event such buildings had not been cleared 
(FEMA, 2011).  
Development of Storm-Water Management Design Criteria 
 Since the devastation of the Midwest Flood, flood prediction research and development 
activities in the Kansas City area have aimed to identify optimal stormwater control requirements. 
In 2008, 53 years of precipitation data from the Kansas City region were applied to the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Storm Water Management Model (SWMM) to conduct 
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water flow simulations in receiving stream channels (Pomeroy et al., 2008). Data from the region 
was used to examine future erosion potential as the result of urbanization of different streambed 
materials. Research findings indicated coarse streambed materials were less sensitive to changes 
in erosion. Thus, the application of appropriate storm-water control features includes prior analysis 
based on characteristics of erosion potential (Pomeroy, et al, 2008). Although extensive damage 
occurred in the aftermath of the 1993 floods, both scientists and engineers recognized the 
importance and value of conducting flood prediction exploration and experiments. Knowledge 
gained from such experiments ultimately serves to increase community resilience and benefit flood 
mitigation policy nationwide (Changnon, 2005).  
Lessons Learned from the Great Midwest Flood  
Inadequate Flood Control Systems and Floodplain Management  
 When the flooding occurred in 1993, Kansas City and the surrounding region had relied on 
levees and various flood control methods, with over 1,500 levees running the length of the 
Missouri and Mississippi River Basins (Changnon, 2001; Hickcox, 1994). In examining the 
performance of the levee systems in regulating regional water levels, 6 out of 48 (12.5 percent) of 
federal levees failed within Kansas City while all 818 private levees were breached or topped 
(Hickcox, 1994).  
 Two factors attributed to the failure of the levee systems in Kansas City, Kansas, including 
poor communications between officials in determining the placement of local levees versus federal 
levees. Unclear federal limitations and guidelines and non-existent local floodplain regulations 
created the conditions for the levees to become overwhelmed and breached by floodwaters 
(Galloway, 1995). In addition, a lack of local floodplain regulations also left many communities 
and businesses without levee systems to protect and prevent the overflow of water (Nelson, 2018). 
The second attributing factor includes how the construction of levees vastly alters and constrains 
the height and flow of a river. While a levee may relieve pressure at one point in a river, it can 
create further problems upstream and downstream (Hilcox, 1994). As the water seeks an exit, it 
will overspill smaller levees upstream and potentially devastate any communities lying within 
those floodplains while the water headed downstream flows faster and higher, breaching any 
weaker or compromised levees (Hilcox, 1994).  
36 
 The 1993 floods also served as an example for the importance of stricter local policies to 
control levee and floodplain management within urban and rural areas of the Kansas City region. 
Communities which lacked appropriate policies and procedures on levee maintenance and 
placement experienced higher breaches than those levees that were coordinated with or built by 
the federal government. While levee systems are intended to be one of the most efficient and 
cheaper policy options to mitigate and prevent flood damage, clear policy objectives across levels 
of government are necessary to increase protection abilities as harm to a floodplain can have direct 
and lasting consequences affecting the physical and environmental safety of a region. In addition, 
communities that engage in the planning process to build local levees need to consider long-term 
solutions and address problems which could occur in the worst-case events (100 and even 500-
year floodplains).   
 One of the most cited problems as a result of the 1993 Midwest Flood was the lack of 
public policy for managing development and flood control systems within the floodplains of the 
Missouri and Mississippi River Basins (Hickox, 1994; Changnon, 2001). As there was not one 
single federal or state agency with the responsibility to regulate the development/destruction of 
floodplains, they became mis-managed and improperly monitored. (Hickox, 1994). In addition, 
several state floodplain managers did not comply with the 1977 Floodplain Management Executive 
Order which mandates federal agencies to demonstrate there is no alternative to building in a 
floodplain and requires preventative actions to be taken to minimize risks (Galloway, 1995).  
In the case of the Kansas City river tributary Turkey Creek, unchecked development on the 
Kansas City suburban watershed altered the route and flow of the creek. Specifically, the area was 
a focus for transportation development for a majority of the community's history. This resulted in 
significant flooding damages to the surrounding community whenever heavy rainfall occurred 
(Kabbes et al., 2013). At the time of the Kansas City Floods, around 90 percent of the watershed 
had been urbanized (Kabbes et al., 2013). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and 
ecological experts determined that if additional urbanization were to take place in the watershed, 
extensive consequences (such as the 1993 floods) could create irreparable damage to the urban 
community and the ecology of the environment (Kabbes et al., 2013). Taking into account the 
area’s flooding history, the USACE and community stakeholders determined the leading course 
of action would be to slowly begin to restore the environment of the Turkey Creek watershed by 
expanding floodplains and removing unnecessary developments (Kabbe et al., 2013). Highly 
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urbanized watersheds are one of the key issues confronting communities experiencing urban 
flooding events. If residents desire to live in or near floodplains surrounding streams and rivers, 
environmental principles and preservation actions are necessary in order to reduce the risk of urban 
flooding events in the future. In examining the communities selected for case study analysis, a lack 
of policy led to significant problems and exacerbated damages. Correspondingly, officials and 
leaders in the area responded with policies and approaches, such as the Turkey Creek project, to 
ensure such devastation would never be experienced again. 
Policy Changes and Areas for Improvement 
The 1993 Great Midwest Flood ultimately resulted in the identification of several necessary 
policy changes. Most notably, changes to the National Flood Insurance Program Act and Federal 
Crop Insurance Program in 1994 led to increased sales and better coverage as well as less reliance 
on relief payments (Changnon, 2005). Such changes have been successful in improving the 
nation’s flood policy and increasing resilience. Since the Great Midwest Flood, however, some 
areas experienced a lack of action. Although considerable funding has been appropriated to restore 
damaged levees, such as the Kansas City Levees project, little has been done to alleviate the risks 
associated with current floodplain management practices. Furthermore, an improvement plan for 
the Upper Mississippi River Basin has not come to fruition since the Great Midwest Flood 
(Changnon, 2005). Conflicting goals, policy objectives, and differing views may continue to affect 
actions necessary to prevent another disaster of such magnitude and could have potentially 
negative consequences for future preparedness and resilience.  
Relevance to the City of Wharton 
 The Kansas City area serves as an example of the importance of improving physical 
infrastructure and managing flood risk. Innovative approaches to flood risk management, including 
the development of the Turkey Creek and Kansas City Levee Projects, provide a framework for 
communities like the City of Wharton in working to increase state and local community resilience, 
understand the role of money during natural disasters, and strengthen ongoing recovery efforts. 
The Great Midwest Flood of 1993 affirmed it is imperative for federal and local policies and 
actions to improve flood-prevention infrastructure, to mitigate efforts, and increase local 
resilience.  
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Case Study #2: Rhode Island Flooding, 2010 
Introduction 
As we noted, in examining the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, understanding the effects 
of previous disasters in other communities can help identify lessons learned across levels of 
stakeholders and determine which actions, best-practices, and experiences from other areas are 
applicable to the City of Wharton in their recovery and planning efforts. This case study will 
examine the March 2010 flooding event in Rhode Island, which was similar to Wharton in terms 
of impact, damages, and funding opportunities.  
Background of Floods 
 In the Spring of 2010, Rhode Island experienced the worst flooding event in its history as 
the result of multiple precipitation events (NOAA, 2018). Factors attributing to the flooding 
include a heavy rainfall event which lasted from March 30th to 31st (Grumm, n.d.). In total, 19 to 
25 inches of rain was measured in the New England area as a result of the rainfall leading five 
major watershed basins to flow above capacity (U.S. Department of Interior, & U.S. Geological 
Survey, 2011).  In addition, flooding in the region reached the 100-year flood mark and high-water 
markers measured peak loads 88% above normal (U.S. Department of Interior, & U.S. Geological 
Survey, 2011). 
All five Rhode Island counties were included in Disaster Declaration 1894, opening the 
entire state to federal assistance dollars to go towards recovery efforts (NOAA, 2018; FEMA, 
2010; FEMA, 2010). It is estimated total home damage was $100 million with an additional $70 
million worth of damage to businesses across Rhode Island. (OHCD, 2010) Two major Rhode 
Island critical infrastructure facilities (a water treatment plant and an electricity substation) were 
damaged by the flood, requiring every Rhode Island citizen to conserve water and electricity until 
the facilities could be repaired (CBS, 2010; NOAA,2013).   
Recovery  
Although there was not an existing recovery plan in place prior to the flooding event, there 
were action plans implemented at the state level and in those jurisdictions, which received 
additional funding from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Almost 
all recovery preparation, planning, and implementation of funding priorities were the responsibility 
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of the RI Housing and Community Development Department. At the state level, officials named 
three focus areas for recovery which include “using FEMA Public Assistance Monies to rebuild 
infrastructure, coordination of private resources with non-profits, and development of municipal 
Hazard Mitigation Plans,” (OHCD, 2010 pg. 5).   
Approved FEMA dollars totaled $61 million for recovery assistance, with over half of the 
amount approved for individual household grants (OHCD, 2010). In addition to immediate funds 
provided by FEMA, Rhode Island was awarded nearly $9 million at the state level and two cities 
(Cranston and Warwick) were each awarded separate allocations of $1.2 and $2.7 million 
respectively to assist in their specific recovery efforts by HUD through its Community 
Development Block Grant - Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) fund. An estimated 3,000 businesses 
were awarded $43 million in loans by the Small Business Administration (SBA) (OHCD, 2010). 
Loans were used by business owners to address damages, make any necessary repairs, and regain 
economic stability after the flood. 
Recovery planning and activities were largely contingent on the HUD CDBG-DR grants 
awarded to the state and did not include mitigation and/or recovery activities beyond what funding 
would allow. Planning for future events was divided into short-term and long-term goals. In the 
short-term, the state wanted to use CDBG-DR Funding for financial assistance to businesses which 
lost critical assets or operating revenue as a result of the flood; assistance to individuals with 
eligible unmet needs; repairs, rehabilitation and debris removal programs for affected private 
property; and assistance to municipalities for repairs to damaged infrastructure and the provision 
of public services necessary as a result of the flood. In the long term, the state anticipated using 
CDBG-DR funds to improve hazard mitigation strategies and conduct buyout programs for 
structures prone to flooding (OHCD, 2010).  
 To achieve the second recovery goal of coordinating resources with non-profits, the Rhode 
Island Disaster Long-Term Recovery Group (RIDLTRG) was established through the local United 
Way. In creating this group, 71 non-profits collaborated monetarily and through in-kind donations 
to establish the fund which was used to fulfill unmet needs. 
In creating proposals consistent with HUD requirements, Cranston and Warwick, two town 
in Rhode Island which experienced heavy damage during the flood, implemented recovery action 
plans separately which were similar to the state’s plan, however, within the context of a limited 
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scope (Department of Community Development for the City of Cranston, 2011). Both cities 
implemented plans that incorporated the short-term agenda of providing financial and technical 
assistance to affected parties. In the long term, the remaining funding was intended to be used for 
mitigation activities such as home buyout programs, flood risk analysis, and flood control barriers. 
Specifically, the assessment of critical infrastructure and home buyouts were two activities 
earmarked as part of long-term hazard mitigation efforts. In addition, each individual plan included 
mechanisms for monitoring funding usage.  
Unanticipated Problems 
Home Buyouts 
As mentioned in the first case study, home buyouts are a tool often used by local 
government officials in the hazard mitigation process as a way to permanently remove citizens and 
structures from hazardous zones. While home buyouts represent an identified policy option to 
improve community resilience, the Rhode Island case serves as an example that recovery efforts 
are often not resistant to the pace of bureaucratic governance and can sometimes be difficult to 
qualify for. Following the flooding event, 38 homeowners had applied for FEMA voluntary buyout 
funding. By December of 2011, 37 applications had been denied presumably because of outdated 
flood maps used by FEMA in conducting the cost-benefit analysis to determine approval for 
acquisition. One Councilman argued the cost-benefit analysis used for buyout decisions was 
flawed while also acknowledging a paperwork change may have contributed to the large number 
of denials. The paperwork changes were caused by the second round of flooding from Hurricane 
Irene when 2010 applications were “stuck somewhere in Washington, D.C. in the midst of a freeze 
on FEMA funds,” (Schieldrop, 2011). As of September 2015, following three rounds of 
applications, no additional buildings were found to be eligible for a buyout. Leftover funding was 
taken back by HUD. Despite this reallocation, 21 homes were acquired (Kasakove, 2017). 
Attempts to facilitate home buyouts, in this case, did not serve as an effective strategy primarily 
due to a cost-benefit analysis conducted by FEMA which placed strict limitations on homes which 
could be purchased and resulted in paperwork issues affecting potential awards.  
Communication  
Communication channels and protocols are critical elements to establish during emergency 
management planning in addition to daily operations. As part of disaster protocol, some Rhode 
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Island officials are instructed to communicate with each other through two sources including an 
800 MHz radio and an online forum called Web-EOC. However, it should be noted not all agencies 
were included in these communication channels. For example, the municipal wastewater treatment 
facility officials were not provided sufficient communication information during the emergency. 
This incident is important in light of the facility, which flooded during the storm, creating 
municipal water issues for the entire state. Although it cannot be determined whether including 
the facility members in the circulation of communication could have alleviated this facility from 
flooding, it is important to consider who or what entities are included or excluded from 
communication and decision-making during a disaster. 
  In the “Rhode Island Emergency Management Advisory Council The 2010 Flood: 
Lessons Learned” panel, members of the state, local, and private levels all identified 
communication as an area which could be improved (Offices of RI Department of Transportation, 
2010). This consensus is supported by the lack of reverse 911 calling in some smaller communities. 
Reverse 911 allows officials to use existing 911 systems to dial out to landlines to notify citizens 
of an emergency (Sammamish.wa.us, 2010). While large communities such as the City of 
Coventry were able to evacuate 2400 people using reverse 911, other townships such as West 
Warwick found communication with citizens to be difficult without the technology. Similarly, 
small communities found it difficult to communicate with their own staff because of a lack of 
centralized communication space. The Richmond Town Council member Judge Reddish III stated 
during the Panel his community is looking into installing a conference call number for better 
communication (RI Department of Transportation, 2010). 
Successful Practices    
Research 
Prior to the event, the state of Rhode Island made significant efforts in researching the 
effects of climate change in the region (Georgetown Climate Center.,2018). Although these efforts 
did not directly relate to hazard mitigation or recovery, they demonstrate a willingness and 
acknowledgment of vulnerabilities affecting Rhode Island and the importance of increasing overall 
resilience. To complete the inquiry, the Rhode Island Commission on Climate Change was created 
with FEMA funding at the beginning of 2010. The ‘Resilient Rhodie’ action strategy was produced 
in 2017, which used research and science to identify statewide vulnerabilities and potential needs 
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in the face of climate change (Rhode Island Office of Governor, 2017). Since March 2010, Rhode 
Island has continued to address vulnerabilities through scientific research studies. Four studies 
focused on climate change implications, watershed and river modeling, and risk management have 
been conducted in the period since the flooding occurred (OHCD, 2010). A result of these 
initiatives includes the creation of a $300,000 flood wall along an adjacent river as an effort to 
mitigate future flooding in Cranston (Roberts, 2011). 
In addition, research has contributed to the planning process at both the state and municipal 
level. Since 2010, comprehensive plans which include land use planning and mitigation actions, 
have been produced by 31 municipalities (Rhode Island Department of Administration, 2018). 
Although it is not clear if the flooding in 2010 prompted the attention to increase planning efforts, 
it is relevant to highlight the actions taken to identify, address, and respond to future hazards.   
Personnel Training 
Another activity which can be attributed to the successful response to this flooding event 
is the Rhode Island Emergency Management Administration’s (RIEMA) participation in crisis 
training and alternative preparedness events. Training operations across several agencies, 
including National Guard, fire, and police departments participated in a Vigilant Guard training in 
addition to standard training activities. This training opportunity allowed teams to prepare for 
disaster response by participating in a real-world simulation. The value of situational training and 
awareness serves to increase the capacity of responders from all levels of government in gaining 
valuable emergency management and response experience (Army, 2017).  
Community-Based Centers for Recovery 
In the interim between the response and recovery phase, five Disaster Recovery Centers 
were opened in an effort to streamline the recovery process. These centers were intended to create 
“one-stop-shops” for disaster assistance and stayed open until May 2010. Representatives from 
SBA, FEMA, mental health professionals, and caseworkers were there to help citizens navigate 
the recovery assistance process and support communication operations at all levels of government. 
The Disaster Recovery Centers are recognized for the successful allocation of individual FEMA 
assistance grants and SBA loans to business owners and for distributing critical recovery 
information to citizens in a timely manner.   
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Targeted Funding Allocations 
 The reality of the disaster recovery process indicates some categories of citizens are 
affected disproportionately than the rest of society in and following a natural disaster. In the case 
of Rhode Island, it was found low-income households were more likely to experience the effects 
of natural disasters at a higher rate (Roberts, 2011). In an interview conducted by Brown University 
students at the Center for Environmental Studies, Paul Salera the director of Westbay, a local non-
profit, discussed this topic. From his experience of the 2010 floods, he conveyed “people coming 
in [to Westbay] for flood assistance was already in the [Westbay] system.” (Roberts, 2011, p. 52). 
Meaning many of the people seeking assistance after the disaster were disadvantaged in some way, 
and using nonprofit services prior to the storm. Re-emphasizing the idea that vulnerable 
populations often require additional funding in comparison to the normal citizen.  This statement 
demonstrates that community members who need the most help after a disaster, are often those 
who needed help pre-disaster. In this case, there is evidence that the lowest income communities 
(West Warwick and Cranston) were the ones to receive the most FEMA funding and illustrates the 
finding that low-income brackets will typically be the most affected by disaster (Roberts, 2011). 
In addition, 39 percent of statewide homeowners who received funding fell into the low to medium 
income bracket with an estimated 25,000 households who applied for individual assistance 
(OHCD, 2010). Ultimately, 14,744 were approved by FEMA (FEMA, 2010). While nearly 60 
percent of those who applied for funding received such assistance, challenges were identified for 
individuals who received FEMA funding following this disaster. In this case, it appears that 
individuals who needed the most help were able to receive assistance and the necessary resources 
to address recovery challenges.  
Key Takeaways: The Great Midwest and Rhode Island Case Studies 
While the events experienced by these two communities during the Rhode Island and 
Midwestern flooding events were not exactly like the experiences of Wharton during Hurricane 
Harvey, actions, challenges, and best practices are relevant and can be applied to Wharton.  
Both case studies demonstrate the importance of effective communication and emergency 
management policies in place when a disaster occurs. In the Great Midwest Flooding event of 
1993, successful communication techniques served as a critical asset prior to the onset of the 
flooding. Kansas City region officials were able to effectively notify and warn citizens of potential 
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dangers by issuing five times the normal amount of flood warnings to the public. In Rhode Island, 
communication efforts were supported by technology and notification techniques including 
reverse 911 and the EOC system. Rhode Island government officials recognized the ability to stay 
in communication worked in helping to increase overall safety and emergency management 
functions during the storm, as the state did not have an emergency protocol to address river 
flooding.  
In identifying communication as a key asset in the case of Rhode Island and The Great 
Midwest Flood, such practices extend to disasters across affected communities and represent a 
vital mitigation and preparedness strategy to improve response outcomes. As mentioned in the 
Rhode Island case study, there was not an existing plan in place to address river flooding. As a 
result, emergency management teams were forced to use hurricane preparedness plans which 
addressed flooding to respond to the emergency. Officials acknowledge this method of emergency 
management was not sustainable to address flooding events in the future. Since the flooding 
occurred, existing emergency plans at all levels of government have been updated to include river 
flooding and response areas unique to such events. 
 Updating existing emergency plans addresses another important lesson for communities 
affected by flooding which includes using scientific studies to create and validate emergency plans. 
By conducting scientific studies, communities can identify risks, understand potential hazards, and 
develop strategies to determine response actions in the event of a disaster. In addition, data 
gathered from studies can be leveraged to implement actions that work to increase mitigation and 
response capacity. An example of such activity includes the city of Cranston in Rhode Island a 
building a flood wall to reduce the effects of future flooding. Similarly, the flooding events in the 
Kansas City region prompted scientific research and policies to be implemented in order to better 
prepare for and mitigate future flooding events. For example, the Turkey Creek restoration project 
expanded floodplains and removed unnecessary developments to better protect against potential 
damages as a result of flooding.  
The Rhode Island case study serves as a reminder that funding can often be challenging for 
individual citizens to obtain and the application process is often difficult to navigate. Examples of 
such challenges include attempted home acquisitions in which a majority of applicants were 
declined in their requests to have their home buyouts after experiencing consecutive floods. In 
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addition, the low number of approvals was attributed to the cost-benefit analysis used by FEMA 
as well as paperwork issues affecting the application process. However, sources generally did not 
express difficulty in obtaining funding for individual assistance or small business loans. Such 
outcomes may be attributed to the establishment of community-based recovery centers, which 
were placed throughout the hardest hit regions. By having direct access to representatives from 
these agencies, citizens may have experienced a decreased amount of difficulty in applying for 
recovery assistance. Conversely, federally funded home buyout programs were shown to be 
extremely successful following the Great Midwest Flood.  
Both case studies serve to examine existing best practices and response actions in 
communities affected by natural disasters and identify areas which can be improved to increase 
resilience and strengthen the planning and execution of disaster management techniques and 
procedures. From this analysis, Wharton and similar communities can learn from these experiences 
and apply best practices to strengthen local government awareness and support response and 
recovery operations.  
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Post Harvey Public Opinion: A Secondary Data Analysis 
The following section will provide further information in regards to the impact of 
Hurricane Harvey in different counties within the State of Texas. The analysis includes data 
collected from two surveys- Kaiser Family Foundation Post-Harvey Survey and the Texas A&M 
Hurricane Harvey Survey. For the scope of our capstone project, the following information 
provides a useful representation of individual experiences in the aftermath of Harvey, reflects key 
themes previously examined in the literature review, and will support final report 
recommendations to improve emergency planning and strengthen preparedness activities for future 
natural disasters.   
Kaiser Family Foundation Post-Harvey Survey 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, the Kaiser Family Foundation conducted a telephone 
survey of a random sample of people living in 24 counties along the Texas Gulf Coast. The 
counties were selected based on FEMA’s property damage mapping analysis (See Figure 1). The 
region was further divided into four groups of counties (See Figure 2): 1) Harris County; 2) 
Counties surrounding Harris3  (Liberty, Chambers, Galveston, Brazoria, Matagorda, Wharton, 
Colorado, Austin, Waller, Fort Bend, Montgomery, and Walker counties); 3) Golden Triangle 
(Jefferson, Hardin, and Orange counties); and 4) Coastal counties (Nueces, San Patricio, Refugio, 
Aransas, Calhoun, Victoria, Jackson, and Lavaca counties). 
 
                                               
3 The Kaiser Family Foundation Data refers to this group as “Outside Harris,” which is how the analysis will be 
addressing this group. 
47 
 
Figure 1: Counties included in survey sample based on FEMA damage assessments 
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, https://gis.fema.gov/REST/services/FEMA/FEMA_DAMAGE_Assessments/MapServer 
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Figure 2: Counties divided by groups 
 
 Although the analysis was not conducted specifically for Wharton County, the information 
provides a general overview and context for describing significant impacts of Hurricane Harvey 
and the areas that could benefit from greater attention and consideration. The following four 
sections (A to D) are based on descriptive analysis of the Kaiser Family Foundation data and 
represents information concerning the region as a whole in addition to data for the groupings of 
counties mentioned previously. Section E, based on the Texas A&M University data, will 
summarize the main policies which citizens consider necessary to ensure adequate recovery. 
1.    Areas of Disruption 
As previously discussed in the literature review, all aspects of a community can experience 
disruption following a natural disaster including areas of physical infrastructure, housing, and local 
businesses. In examining resources affecting recovery, different levels of financial capacity 
impacts how communities respond to natural disasters as supported by the data and referenced (see 
page 15) (Mitsova et al., 2019; Rumbach, Makarewicz, & Németh, 2015). Furthermore, delays in 
re-establishing housing often interrupt and suspend other dimensions of recovery operations 
(Peacock, 2007). Such factors represent extensive challenges for local officials to consider when 
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almost 66 percent4  of respondents from counties surveyed reported being affected by Hurricane 
Harvey in terms of housing and vehicle damage, employment disruption, or income loss (KFF, 
2017). It working to understand impacts of damage, is important to consider the following 
question: 
Was your home or the place you were living damaged as a result of Hurricane Harvey, or 
not? 
Considering all counties surveyed, 49 percent of respondents stated they experienced 
damages where they lived, whereas the other 51 percent of respondents did not report experiencing 
damages. When examining this information by groups of counties, out of all respondents who 
reported damage because of Hurricane Harvey, 36 percent belong to Harris County, while 15.3 
percent are from groups outside Harris County. In both Golden Triangle and Coastal counties, 24 
percent of respondents reported experiencing housing structure damage. 
 Table 1: Respondents by group of counties, whose living place was damaged 
Group Percentage 
Harris 35.5% 
Outside 
Harris 15.3% 
Golden 
Triangle 24.4% 
Coastal 24.8% 
All counties 49.1% 
A lasting impact individual who experience disasters often face is the financial burden of 
rebuilding. When combined with loss of income, such challenges could exacerbate and delay the 
recovery process. To understand the effects of unemployment and income loss as a result of a 
natural disaster, the following question was considered: 
As a result of Hurricane Harvey, have you or another family member living in your 
household been laid off or lost a job, had overtime or regular hours cut back at work or 
experienced any loss of income? 
                                               
4 Data shown in the Kaiser Family Foundation Report” An Early Assessment of Hurricane Harvey’s Impact on 
Vulnerable Texans in the Gulf Coast Region,” pg. 5. Retrieved from: http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-An-
Early-Assessment-of-Hurricane-Harveys-Impact-on-Vulnerable-Texans-in-the-Gulf.  
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Considering the 24 counties surveyed, 13 percent of respondents were laid off or lost a job, 
while 29 percent had regular or overtime hours cut back at work, and 28 percent experienced other 
losses of income, such as lost income from a small business or unpaid missed days of work. In 
analyzing the data across county groups, Harris County reports the highest number of respondents 
that experienced a loss of income due to Hurricane Harvey, followed by respondents of counties 
from the Golden Triangle. 
 
Figure 3: Percentages of people who underwent some employment loss as a result of Harvey 
2.    The Level of Disruption (Short-Term and Long-Term Damage) 
Taking into account efforts to improve response and recovery after a natural disaster, 
actions are often specifically directed at rapidly reducing risk, engaging in the protection and 
reconstruction of critical infrastructure, and working to restore daily operations in affected 
communities (Ingram et al., 2006). Research findings indicate the response process after a natural 
disaster is usually swift, but short-lived, which can have direct consequences for long-term 
community recovery (Moore et al., 2004). As discussed on page 20, this short-lived response may 
also affect the ability of local governments to effectively address emergency response and recovery 
following a disaster. As a result, it is important to address short and long-term damages in order to 
effectively manage emergency response operations and support the rebuilding process. Questions 
concerning damages, major problems, and recovery status include:  
If your home or the place you were living was damaged by Harvey, was that minor damage 
that could be repaired within a month, major damage requiring more than a month to repair, 
or was your home destroyed? 
13%
33% 31%
12%
25% 25%
14%
29% 28%
12%
24% 24%
13%
29% 28%
Been laid off or lost a job Had overtime or regular hours cut
back at work
Had any other loss of income, such as
lost income from a small business or
unpaid missed days of work
Harris Outside Harris Golden Triangle Coastal All counties
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Results suggest 51 percent of respondents stated damage was minor, meaning that it could 
be repaired within a month. Roughly 40 percent reported their place of residence experienced 
major damage potentially requiring more than a month to complete repairs and 8 percent of 
respondents stated their home had been destroyed. 
Table 2: Percentages of respondents by group of counties that experienced some 
level of damage in their living place 
Damage 
Harris Outside Harris 
Golden 
Triangle Coastal 
All 
counties 
Minor damage 57% 44% 38% 61% 51% 
Major damage 37% 47% 50% 33% 41% 
Home was destroyed 6% 9% 12% 6% 8% 
 
In examining the data by groups of counties, it is important to recognize although in 
absolute terms Harris County overall had the highest number of respondents report experiencing 
damage, in relative terms, counties from the Golden Triangle experienced greater widespread 
damage and housing destruction. 
 
Figure 4: Percentages of respondents by groups of counties experiencing various levels of damage 
As mentioned previously, delays in re-establishing housing could potentially interrupt 
other aspects of overall recovery. Correspondingly, the following questions were used to identify 
levels of disruption in focusing on recovery efforts: 
Was the loss of income or property damage you experienced as a result of the hurricane a 
major problem, a minor problem, or not a problem for you and your family? 
From the respondents affected by Hurricane Harvey, 50 percent stated that the loss of 
income or property damage was a major problem, while 36 percent reported this as a minor 
problem, and 13 percent stated it was not a problem at all. In analyzing the data by groups of 
57%
44%
38%
61%
37%
47% 50%
33%
6% 9%
12%
6%
Harris Outside Harris Golden Triangle Coastal
Minor damage Major damage Home was destroyed
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counties, although the tendency is the same, in counties belonging to the Golden Triangle, the 
proportion of respondents reporting major problems from damage is higher (61 percent). This 
result supports research findings identified in the literature review regarding the idea that damage 
is experienced differently throughout a community (Peacock et al., 2015). Furthermore, Peacock 
et al. (2015) emphasize low-income and minority populations are often at a greater disadvantage 
and experienced greater effects as a result of decreased ability to bounce back from a disaster. 
 
Figure 5: Percentages of respondents reporting loss or income or property damage by magnitude of the problem  
After a natural disaster, it is critical for recovery efforts to focus on actions to ensure the 
daily life of residents can return to normal while increasing planning practices and preparedness 
measures to reduce risks for future natural disasters. Respondents affirmed the importance of such 
actions, as officials maintained local recovery efforts should work on returning the community to 
a state of normalcy as quickly as possible. The following question examines personal situations 
for recovery: 
Which of the following best describes your personal situation in terms of recovering from 
Hurricane Harvey? Would you say that your day-to-day life is largely back to normal, almost 
back to normal, still somewhat disrupted, or still very disrupted? 
At the time this survey was conducted, 62 percent of respondents said their day-to-day life 
was largely (36 percent) or almost (26 percent) back to normal, while 36 percent still experienced 
disruption at some level. Only 2 percent of respondents did not experience any disruption in their 
day-to-day life. In examining the data by groups of counties, the Golden Triangle reported the 
highest proportion of respondents whose day-to-day life was still disrupted. Harris County has a 
higher "back to normal" rate that could be attributed to higher funds which were distributed to that 
area compared to funds earmarked for smaller counties. 
46% 47%
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50% 50%
36% 38%
31%
37% 36%
16% 15%
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Harris Outside Harris Golden Triangle Coastal All Counties
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Table 3: Day-to-day life situation after Harvey 
  
Harris Outside Harris 
Golden 
Triangle Coastal All counties 
Largely back to normal 41% 39% 21% 38% 36% 
Almost back to normal 27% 24% 25% 25% 26% 
Still somewhat disrupted 19% 20% 24% 23% 21% 
Still very disrupted 10% 13% 29% 12% 15% 
Life was not disrupted 2% 4% 0% 1% 2% 
  
3.    People’s Actions During Harvey 
One of the major challenges local governments and emergency officials experience when 
working to protect residents is confronting different community perceptions of risk affecting the 
willingness or hesitancy of residents to evacuate or take actions to respond to a natural disaster 
(Weller, Baer, & Prochaska, 2016). The following question highlights the importance of people’s 
perceptions when responding to a natural disaster. 
Did you evacuate or leave your home for any amount of time as a result of Hurricane Harvey, 
or not? 
Considering all counties surveyed, 44 percent reported they did not take any action to 
evacuate during Hurricane Harvey. While the other 56 percent reported evacuating or leaving their 
home. However, focusing only on the people that were affected, 55 percent of respondents 
evacuated, while 45 percent of affected people did not. The data presents interesting findings in 
that Harris County (58 percent) and counties outside Harris (47 percent) have the highest 
percentages of affected respondents who did not evacuate (see Figure 6). 
In Wharton, individuals on the Northside of town were impacted by perceptions of risk for 
how their part of the community could potentially flood, as will discussed on page 67 of the 
stakeholder interviews. Wharton’s Northside had not flooded in over 100 years according to 
stakeholders; thus, residents had not experienced a flooding event of the magnitude of Hurricane 
Harvey and ultimately believed their homes would not be impacted by extensive flooding. This 
perception of flood risk is well documented, as discussed on page 19 of the literature review, as 
perceived flood safety strongly influences an occupant’s decision to leave or not to leave. 
In the stakeholder interviews local leaders in Wharton indicated challenges community 
groups experienced when evacuation was necessary. Time of evacuation in Wharton is difficult to 
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calculate as people either could not evacuate, evacuated and became permanently displaced, or 
were able to evacuate and later return to their homes. Stakeholders estimate 800-1,000 residents 
have moved to neighboring towns and cities following damages experienced and issues affecting 
overall recovery.  
 
Figure 6: Percentages of respondents evacuated, by groups of counties 
4.  Perceptions of Recovery Actions 
The capacity to provide post-disaster resources to residents who are most in need is 
important for community recovery and resilience. In these situations, researchers affirm the 
distribution or mobilization of support should follow the ‘‘rule of relative needs,’’ which provides 
the most support is directed to those who need it the most (Norris, Stevens, & Pfefferbaum, 2008). 
Thus, identifying the most vulnerable or affected populations and determining community need 
could improve the recovery process and support short and long-term outcomes. In addition, 
research findings indicate the response following a disaster is typically quick, but short-lived 
(Moore et al., 2004). This tendency is also reinforced in the survey results, which indicates people 
are still struggling in multiple aspects of recovery. 
The next two questions address resident perceptions in terms of how sufficient the 
assistance received has been and which areas were identified as necessary for more help. 
Overall, do you feel like you are getting the help you need to recover from Hurricane Harvey, 
or not? 
Of respondents affected by Hurricane Harvey, 45 percent reported receiving the help they 
needed, while 46 percent stated they were not receiving enough help. Only 7 percent of survey 
respondents said they didn’t need help. Across groups of counties examined, the same behavior 
can be observed among respondents. 
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Figure 7: Percentage of respondents who were affected by Hurricane Harvey  
reporting if they are getting enough help to recover  
In which area do you need more help to recover from Hurricane Harvey? 
Overall, areas respondents reported needing more help to recover from Hurricane Harvey 
includes applying for disaster assistance, repairing damage to their homes, and assistance in 
finding affordable permanent housing. 
 
Figure 8: Areas where more help is needed by the respondent in order  
to recover from Hurricane Harvey 
  
However, in examining the data by groups of counties, the answers differ to some extent. For all 
groups except for Harris County, the top three areas where further assistance is needed include 
applying for disaster assistance, repairing home damage and finding affordable permanent 
housing. For Harris County, receiving medical care was among the top three areas of need. 
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In recognizing factors affecting community resilience, lower-income populations 
experience significant challenges during the recovery process. In analyzing challenges identified 
during the stakeholder interviews, individuals expressed concern for how difficult the recovery 
process is for lower-income families. Concern extends to displaced residents who experience strain 
as a result of housing shortages and difficulties in finding affordable permanent housing after the 
storm. The literature reflects challenges experienced in Wharton, as researchers indicated 
affordable housing is generally in short supply (Tran, 2013). 
  
  
  
  
Figure 9: Areas where more help is needed by the respondent to recover from Hurricane Harvey 
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Considering findings that indicate citizens unanimously consider resources should be 
focused on reconstruction efforts, it is important to determine which specific areas of assistance 
citizens believe resources should be allocated. These results were similarly reflected in the 
stakeholder interviews, which will be further discussed in the next section. Stakeholders reported 
affected homeowners experienced difficulties in acquiring disaster assistance and housing. In 
addition, residents were confronted with challenges in trying to navigate the disaster assistance 
process. As a result, some applications for assistance were denied based on the absence of specific 
details or unmet requirements residents did not know were necessary or had at the time of 
application. 
The data also reflects research findings within the literature regarding social vulnerabilities 
affecting a community. Researchers identify low-income populations as having fewer overall 
resources to effectively recover following a natural disaster and the extent of damage experienced 
in these communities is typically greater than those with more resources (Masozera et al., 2006; 
Zhang & Peacock, 2009). In addition, low-income individuals experience difficulties in finding 
temporary or permanent housing within their local areas. The following question addresses 
perceptions regarding the allocation of resources: 
Thinking about the rebuilding and recovery efforts in your area, if more resources are 
necessary please tell in which areas more resources should be allocated. 
Overall, respondents think more efforts were needed for getting financial help to people 
who need it, rebuilding destroyed homes, and providing access to affordable permanent and 
temporary housing, in that order of priority. 
 
Figure 10: Ranking of areas where more resources are needed for the rebuilding efforts to recover from Hurricane 
Harvey 
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The same tendency was found when analyzing the data by groups of counties, except for 
the Coastal area which believes more resources are needed for making more affordable permanent 
housing available.  
Table 4: Ranking of areas where more resources are needed for the rebuilding efforts to recover from Hurricane 
Harvey by county 
  Harris 
Outside 
Harris 
Golden 
Triangle Coastal 
All 
Counties 
Getting financial help to those who need it 22% 25% 20% 15% 21% 
Rebuilding destroyed homes 20% 16% 22% 17% 19% 
Making temporary housing available 14% 16% 15% 16% 15% 
Making more affordable permanent housing 
available 13% 14% 16% 18% 15% 
Removing trash and debris 8% 10% 8% 9% 8% 
Repairing damaged schools 6% 6% 4% 7% 6% 
Getting mental health services to those who 
need them 5% 3% 2% 2% 4% 
Cleaning up pollutants release flooding 4% 3% 2% 5% 4% 
Repairing roads and highways 4% 3% 3% 5% 4% 
Helping small businesses that were affected 
by the storm 2% 2% 4% 2% 2% 
 
The role of decision-makers across levels of government is key to provide adequate 
recovery operations and complete mitigation efforts to increase community resilience. The efforts 
made by different government actors should not be isolated and instead should be congruent to 
ensure effective response and recovery. The importance of involvement across levels of 
government is discussed in the stakeholder interviews, as individuals emphasized the value of 
effective communication and coordination. In this context it is necessary to consider questions to 
understand how people perceive the actions completed by different levels of government in 
responding to a natural disaster: 
How would you rate the job these institutions are doing in responding to Hurricane Harvey? 
The data collected finds that the majority of respondents from all counties believe all levels 
of government are doing a good job of responding to Hurricane Harvey. Nevertheless, it appears 
respondents agree a better job could be done by the President and US Congress. Additionally, 
citizens from all the counties surveyed agree that from all levels of government, local officials in 
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their respective communities have done the best job in terms of providing emergency response and 
recovery efforts. 
Table 5: The level of satisfaction with the job done as a response to the hurricane by institution and group of 
counties 
    Excellent 
Very 
good Good Fair Poor 
US Congress           
  Harris 8% 11% 31% 31% 18% 
  Outside Harris 6% 12% 31% 27% 24% 
  Golden Triangle 8% 7% 26% 28% 31% 
  Coastal 9% 11% 30% 27% 22% 
Texas State Officials           
  Harris 17% 20% 37% 18% 8% 
  Outside Harris 20% 25% 31% 17% 7% 
  Golden Triangle 17% 19% 29% 22% 13% 
  Coastal 19% 20% 37% 18% 6% 
Government officials in your county           
  Harris 18% 21% 36% 17% 7% 
  Outside Harris 16% 23% 35% 18% 8% 
  Golden Triangle 16% 18% 29% 22% 15% 
  Coastal 18% 22% 32% 20% 8% 
Local officials in your city or town           
  Harris 24% 21% 33% 16% 6% 
  Outside Harris 21% 24% 29% 17% 8% 
  Golden Triangle 21% 21% 25% 17% 16% 
  Coastal 22% 19% 33% 19% 8% 
President Trump           
  Harris 12% 9% 18% 22% 39% 
  Outside Harris 19% 15% 24% 12% 31% 
  Golden Triangle 18% 12% 23% 21% 27% 
  Coastal 19% 12% 20% 17% 33% 
  
The KKF survey information is consistent with our literature review findings in terms of 
vulnerability, short-term and long-term recovery actions, and identification of where more 
resources and assistance are needed to ensure improved recovery and preparedness outcomes. The 
following section from the Texas A&M University data examines resident perceptions in terms of 
policy issues which need to be addressed and actions that could be implemented to help manage 
the effects of Hurricane Harvey. Further information on community perceptions in terms of factors 
which contributed to flooding, areas where the government needs to invest during the disaster 
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recovery period, and which level of government bears the greater responsibility to address the 
effects of natural disasters is available in Appendix B.  
Texas A&M Hurricane Harvey Survey 
The survey conducted by Texas A&M University in February 2018, complements the 
information obtained by the Kaiser Family Foundation survey in terms of citizen perceptions and 
ideas for actions needed to mitigate the effects of natural disasters. The survey had a total of 198 
responses from the Houston area and provides valuable information which reflects the views of 
the majority of areas affected by Hurricane Harvey. 
5.    Citizens’ Participation and Feedback for Policy-Makers 
As previously mentioned, one of the primary obstacles communities experience, when a 
natural disaster occurs, is the lack of community input gathered during mitigation and recovery 
planning. Citizen participation and involvement across the community is essential for a successful 
planning process, not only in terms of committing resources to mitigation efforts but also 
committing financial resources to address needed expenditures (Brody, Godschalk, & Burby, 
2003). Furthermore, as discussed on page 22, community involvement in the planning and 
recovery process can increase the rate at which families and homes are able to recover (Sadri et 
al., 2016). To address the role of community input in mitigation and prevention planning, the 
following questions were examined: 
Have you participated in any community forums or planning discussions to address flooding 
in your neighborhood and/or community? 
In terms of citizen engagement in the planning process, from the people interviewed, only 
11 percent of respondents participated in planning discussions. This represents a significant 
challenge for both the community and local officials in working to bring as many members of the 
community together to participate in productive planning discussions and mitigation activities. 
 
Figure 11:Percentage of people who participated in planning discussions 
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As shown in Figure 11, the majority of respondents are not participating in planning 
discussions. From the local government’s perspective this could potentially lead to drawbacks in 
terms of understanding the community needs and expectations. Whereas, from the community’s 
perspective, this could lead to a decrease in the understanding of the agency’s responsibilities and 
capacity during the recovery process. Overall this could result in uninformed decision-making that 
may not consider residents’ perspectives. 
To address challenges concerning public participation in the planning process, institutional 
recognition represents the importance of different levels of government working to understand 
what they seek to obtain from public participation, identifying the internal capacity necessary to 
increase public participation, and recognizing the extent to which institutions can commit to citizen 
participation. Additionally, future studies should address if citizens are aware of planning efforts, 
processes, or the plans themselves. 
While recovery from hurricane Harvey goes on, there is also the need to address future flood 
risks through improving or widening the bayous or installing new drainage systems. To what 
extent do you support or oppose attending these types of long-term needs while the recovery 
process from hurricane Harvey is still going on? 
Approximately 80 percent of respondents support actions such as improving or widening 
the bayous or installing new drainage systems in order to address future flood risks. While 
constructing more and larger storm drains can work to improve mitigation outcomes and increase 
community resilience, these improvements are not always favored by local residents due to high 
associated costs and overall disruption to everyday life. 
 
Figure 12: Percentages of respondents by level of support to improving or 
 widening the bayous or installing new drainage systems 
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Some policy actions could be taken to reduce the dangers of future flooding in the Houston 
area. From the following list of possible policy actions, how much would you oppose or 
support each of the options? 
In terms of policy actions to mitigate or reduce potential risks of future flooding, 
respondents believe actions should be mainly focused on improving stormwater systems, limiting 
new development in flood-prone areas, building additional reservoirs and retention ponds, and 
protecting wetlands and open spaces. It is also important to acknowledge that minimizing 
additional developments are among the policy actions most citizens oppose. 
Table 6: Percentages of respondents according to support level of the following policy actions 
 
Strongly 
Oppose 
(0) 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
(5) 
Don't 
Know 
Limit new development in flood 
prone areas 7% 1% 2% 12% 15% 56% 6% 
Elevate the buildings 6% 5% 7% 27% 16% 32% 7% 
Strengthen infrastructure design 
standards 1% 1% 2% 20% 22% 47% 6% 
Establish and implement flood 
hazard reduction programs 3% 1% 5% 16% 23% 38% 12% 
Minimize additional development 10% 4% 15% 24% 11% 30% 6% 
Build additional protective dams 2% 2% 4% 20% 25% 43% 3% 
Build additional protective levees or 
embankments 1% 2% 4% 17% 24% 45% 6% 
Build more reservoirs and retention 
ponds 2% 2% 2% 13% 23% 52% 3% 
Protect wetlands and open spaces 1% 2% 5% 20% 15% 50% 6% 
Improve storm water systems 0% 1% 0% 10% 27% 58% 2% 
Temporarily prohibit development 
in the period immediately after a 
disaster event 
7% 3% 6% 26% 13% 37% 7% 
Charge impact fees for development 
in the flood prone areas 13% 5% 10% 16% 14% 29% 11% 
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Main Findings 
         Hurricane Harvey created severe damage in the State of Texas, exposing not only the 
importance of having plans in place when facing an emergency but also taking adequate and timely 
actions to build community resilience. Overall, from the information gathered by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation and Texas A&M University, we were able to identify that approximately 50 percent 
of respondents experienced damage at some level because of the Hurricane. Of these respondents, 
70 percent experienced a loss of income predominantly due to job loss and cuts in regular hours at 
work. Such findings present evidence on the importance of ensuring businesses are able to return 
back to normal as soon as possible, as these areas of employment represent a source of income for 
residents. Furthermore, the data indicates one of the most impacted areas after Hurricane Harvey 
is housing. Approximately 50 percent of respondents declared experiencing major damage or 
complete destruction of their homes. However, out of those people, only half evacuated in response 
to the emergency. In this context, respondents believe extra help is needed for applying for disaster 
assistance, repairing home damage, and finding affordable permanent housing. 
Considering citizen perceptions in terms of current government actions and assistance 
throughout the recovery period, it is important to recognize respondents overall are more satisfied 
with the performance of local officials rather than any other level of government. Moreover, 
citizens believe everybody should share responsibility for the prevention of long-term flooding 
risks. Across the 24 counties that participated in the survey, citizens indicated that during the 
recovery period the government needs to invest more in the provision of basic services, medical 
resources, and security functions. The data also finds citizens believe policy actions should include 
improvements of storm water systems, limiting new developments in flood-prone areas, 
construction of additional reservoirs and retention ponds, and protection of wetlands, among 
others. According to citizen perceptions, building in inappropriate areas, extensive land covered 
with concrete or solid materials impeding water from flowing, and ineffective intergovernmental 
collaboration are among the greatest factors that contribute to flooding. 
           Finally, it is necessary to recognize although this information does not cover the entire State 
of Texas and counties experienced the impacts of Hurricane Harvey at different levels, this analysis 
still provides relevant information to support the value of emergency planning and community 
engagement in the planning process. 
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Stakeholder Analysis 
1. Purpose of Conducting Stakeholder Interviews   
In order to understand locally-specific problems, efforts, and perceptions of individuals 
who experienced the effects of Hurricane Harvey, information was gathered from 32 stakeholder 
interviews sampled from leaders and organizations in and around the Wharton community. The 
interviews were conducted during March of 2019 and served to provide insight on local 
experiences during the response and recovery process, actions taken by community leaders, and 
opportunities moving forward for the community. Interviews work to reinforce key themes 
identified in the literature review, secondary data analysis, and provide a context for summary 
recommendations presented for consideration to the City of Wharton. Further information about 
the stakeholder discussion guide is available in Appendix A.   
2. Planning  
In a community prone to experiencing flooding such as Wharton, planning for natural 
disasters is an important step in ensuring the community can withstand future events. In the 
discussions with stakeholders throughout the community, planning was a major theme that was 
identified and discussed. Variance in responses examined helps to provide a complete picture of 
the current situation Wharton is facing in regard to planning for future events.  
   During Hurricane Harvey, the major issue that was identified by stakeholders was that 
the north side of Wharton flooded for the first time in recent memory of citizens who have lived 
in the city their entire lives. Although the north side had not flooded in recent history, there were 
plans in place that presented this area could potentially flood. One point conveyed was that 
although existing plans were in place, nothing has been done yet to mitigate these risks or increase 
resilience in the north side. 
 For many residents of the Wharton area, the west side of town is expected to flood no 
matter how little rain falls; therefore, the community and the city are ready to experience this 
flooding. Flood plans for this area of town are geared towards response and recovery, not 
mitigation and prevention. It appeared to be generally accepted by stakeholders that flooding on 
the west side and recovery from it was “down to a science.” Throughout the interviews, the point 
was made that the city has experienced repeated flooding events, making it difficult to get ahead 
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of the recovery process as the focus has been primarily on getting residents back into their houses 
as quickly as possible. As a result of experiencing repeated flooding, officials are left fighting an 
uphill battle with less time and resources left to allocate towards needed future planning.  
  As the city is today, if another ‘Harvey’ hit, one stakeholder affirmed “the exact same 
thing would happen.” This point reinforces the importance of stakeholders’ emphasis for planning 
across jurisdictions, agencies, and levels of government that would include updated flood maps, 
completion of the levee that is being constructed, as well as the experience that was gained by 
going through a flooding event like Harvey. Despite the construction of the levee taking place, it 
is important for the city to continuously improve hazard mitigation planning, especially for 
vulnerable populations.        
Planning across levels of government is an important part of the overall planning process. 
As stakeholders identified, this would allow the early response and activation of resources from 
all levels of government. This type of planning would also assure that no organization is relying 
only on memory, but uses detailed and updated written plans to reference as a resource for response 
and recovery. The importance of written plans was emphasized by stakeholders repeatedly. 
Overall, respondents seemed to agree that Hurricane Harvey exposed areas of need in prior 
planning at the intergovernmental level, and lessons learned have given the community, officials, 
and organizations guidance on important improvements that could be made in the future. 
3. Budgeting 
    One of the most difficult parts of recovery is identifying and managing the budget to 
cover expenses while applying for and waiting for reimbursements from outside organizations and 
government entities. Immediately following Hurricane Harvey, the community had to begin 
recovery efforts. These efforts created expenditures that had to come out of reserves the city had 
on hand. With prior preparation, and existence of these funds, Wharton was able to begin recovery 
efforts by using these reserves to fund efforts such as debris removal. Debris removal is an example 
of a service that could not wait until funding was issued from other government entities. In order 
for citizens to move forward and begin to recover, they had to remove destroyed portions of their 
homes, furniture, and debris left by the flood. The majority of this debris was left along the streets 
and the city was then responsible for its removal. Reimbursements for some of these costs from 
other levels of government did not come through until over a year later.  
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    The City of Wharton did an excellent job of covering the immediate costs of recovery 
while applying for reimbursement opportunities and grants that would cover the costs the city 
allocated during initial recovery operations. Along with the city being responsible for funding 
many recovery efforts, the city was dealing with local revenues being reduced following the 
flooding. For example, many people were displaced from their homes, therefore they were not 
using any utilities and the city was affected from this loss in revenue. According to the interviews 
conducted, the city should be commended on their budgeting practices and capabilities that 
allowed them to meet emergency requirements until outside funding could be allocated to the city. 
4. Unity within the Wharton Community 
 Stakeholder interviews indicate that most community stakeholders have lived in the 
Wharton area for the majority of their lives. This is an important element to consider when 
examining all stages of the disaster cycle. Because of stakeholders’ experience within the 
community, these individuals are likely to have a higher level of connections and are more likely 
to have shared experiences with other individuals in the community. However, some stakeholder 
interviews uncover a hesitancy to accept innovations due to longstanding customs and norms 
within the community. Moving forward, it may be necessary that the hesitancy to accept such 
innovations is recognized and overcome to be creative and ultimately better serve constituents.  
Throughout the stakeholder interviews, the unity of the community during and immediately 
following Hurricane Harvey was a consistent theme. The community came together well during 
and in the wake of the storm. Personal sacrifices made on behalf of city staff and residents were 
noted repeatedly throughout the stakeholder interviews. Unity and sacrifice by local government 
agencies were discussed repeatedly in the interviews. 
However, based on the interviews, continuing this sense of community following a natural 
disaster is essential as recovery can take many years, not just a few weeks. This theme of a short-
lived response is also prevalent in the literature review findings. As discussed on page 20 of the 
literature review, research finds the response process following a natural disaster is typically quick, 
but short-lived. Such findings present important challenges for local communities in continuing 
unity into long term recovery.  
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5. Personnel & Training 
One common theme identified during the stakeholder interviews is the lack of local 
expertise on behalf of FEMA representatives. For example, many interviewees report retirees and 
individuals with no prior emergency response experience being dispatched to the Wharton area 
following Hurricane Harvey. Emergency “substitutes” were pulled in from FEMA in the wake of 
the storm. These individuals were untrained and unfamiliar with the aid processes, according to 
interviewees. Furthermore, one issue discovered is the lack of consistency within the 
representatives sent to the area. In explanation, one FEMA representative would be in Wharton on 
a particular day only to be replaced by someone else entirely only a few days later. 
 Interviewees also stressed the importance of additional training not only for officials at the 
federal level, but also local officials and nonprofit actors. An increase in training and education 
will help in future disaster response and recovery, according to the stakeholders interviewed. A 
need for a volunteer coordinator was also discussed in multiple interviews, as many stakeholders 
noted there was not one single designated volunteer coordinator. 
6. Stakeholder Perceptions of Damage/Response – A Look Toward the Future 
Perceptions of the response and recovery of Hurricane Harvey in the Wharton area display 
both best practices as well as areas for improvement. A common theme during the stakeholder 
interviews is that the community as a whole will never completely recover and the damage to 
social structures is too substantial to ever completely repair. Feelings of abandonment on behalf 
of some stakeholders regarding actions or non-actions by officials of both the State of Texas and 
federal government are prevalent among stakeholders as well. Many respondents felt the damage 
experienced in the Wharton area was equal to that of Harris County, yet media attention and federal 
and state aid were focused primarily on Harris County. 
7. Local Vulnerability 
There was a general consensus among stakeholders that the West End of the town is the 
most vulnerable both because of its location and low socioeconomic status. Numerous actions have 
been taken to address the physical aspects of this vulnerability. However, a few responses 
mentioned that little has been done to address the social and emotional vulnerabilities of the 
community populations of both the North and West ends of town.  
68 
Regarding community vulnerability, the responses pointed towards frustration with federal 
and state agencies who did not understand locally-specific needs. The common theme with FEMA 
was that there was a disconnect between their knowledge of national policies and what would be 
useful for city recovery in this specific instance. Many expressed frustrations with FEMA’s 
response teams due to the practice of acting without understanding the Wharton area at all. In terms 
of state and regional agencies, stakeholders had varying opinions on these institutions. The Texas 
General Land office was described as both a great and frustrating agency, depending on the 
interviewee. Stakeholders acknowledge the intentions of GLO in coming to provide assistance; 
however, the GLO was not always able to help in the recovery process because of a lack of 
understanding local community needs. For example, many stakeholders felt they spent more time 
educating government officials than was spent on recovery efforts. Many expressed frustrations in 
being delayed by officials who did not understand the needs of Wharton, and tried to impose 
unreasonable time limits on the recovery process. 
8. Nonprofit Response 
 The nonprofit response to Hurricane Harvey received large amounts of positive praise 
from the stakeholders of Wharton, Texas. Team Rubicon and the Mennonite Disaster Relief 
Service received excellent praise for the immensity and scale of their responses. Both 
organizations played a large part in the cleaning and rebuilding of homes according to 
stakeholders. One stakeholder responded that the best nonprofit response came from those who 
asked, “what do you need?” and did not act on their own. Nonprofits served to bridge the gap for 
Wharton’s needs when government agencies could not provide assistance yet.  
In regard to coordinating response and recovery efforts with federal and state agencies, 
stakeholder expressed a desire for consistency. FEMA’s coordination was described as confusing 
and complex and for some stakeholders, as there was not a consistent person to talk to as FEMA 
representatives constantly came in and left. Due to the confusing nature of policies and a lack of 
federal coordination, local stakeholders felt as if they had received less help than they really 
needed.  
9. Collaboration and Communication  
 Overall communications during Hurricane Harvey received mixed grades from the 
stakeholders of Wharton. There were many positive reviews of communication with state 
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emergency response officials and the use of social media to communicate with the local residents. 
From the stakeholders interviewed, several areas of improvement have been identified. 
Something that became apparent during the stakeholder interviews was the reliance on cell 
phone coverage for the city to communicate. During the storm, a cell phone tower failed during 
the day, resulting in numerous stakeholders and citizens losing service during this critical time. 
This reliance proved to be problematic for responders and city officials by interrupting 
communications and response efforts for that day. Some stakeholders believed the city should look 
into other methods of communication that do not rely entirely on cell phone coverage. Without 
coverage, internal city communications and communications with the public is at risk when cell 
service is lost. 
While social media served as an important medium for city officials and nonprofit 
organizations, it also became a source of confusing information and misinformation. Some 
stakeholders reported a lack of coordination between the city and county Facebook pages, which 
led to misinformation being spread by residents or intentionally by individuals working to cause 
trouble.  
Finally, several stakeholders noted that Wharton should reach out to similar or neighboring 
communities to determine what solutions work best in times when communications can be difficult 
for cities of Wharton’s size. Through these collaborations, it was thought, Wharton can discover 
different methods that could improve communications during disaster response. These methods 
and techniques will be further examined in the recommendations section of this report.   
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Recommendations 
Based on the literature review, case studies, secondary analysis of public opinion surveys, 
and stakeholder interviews produced through this project, the following are the recommendations 
the team presents for consideration to the City of Wharton.   
Actions for Recovery  
Our research findings indicate that while immediate response after a natural disaster is 
often short-lived, this phase is often characterized by unity of officials and community members 
coming together to address immediate dangers. The team has identified actions the City of 
Wharton can implement to improve the recovery process which includes addressing the needs of 
vulnerable populations, helping citizens apply for assistance, and diversifying funding sources. 
Addressing the Needs of Vulnerable Populations 
While the recovery process is a difficult path for all to go down, there is a section of the 
population which is more vulnerable during disasters and who experience increased negative 
effects and challenges during recovery. As discussed in the literature review, vulnerability is not 
limited to socio-economic status, but can also be exacerbated by physical or mental disability, 
geographic location, or linguistic barriers. In providing assistance to vulnerable populations, 
factors extend beyond monetary resources and should also include areas such as mental health, 
child care, and housing assistance. Because not every citizen will have the same recovery 
experience, it is important for the City of Wharton to acknowledge and assist those who experience 
the most vulnerability in their recovery process. Improving recovery outcomes within vulnerable 
populations can work to build resilience for future disasters and represents a substantial challenge 
for Wharton, and other vulnerable cities, to consider moving forward after a disaster event.  
Other considerations for addressing the needs of vulnerable community members include 
ensuring funding is administered to those who need it. Most federal programs are designed to assist 
homeowners and those who can afford to set aside personal savings for themselves are advantaged. 
One investigation conducted by NPR discovered that, out of 40,000 home buyouts, white 
communities received a disproportionate amount of funding for buyout programs compared to 
communities of higher ethnic diversity (Hersher & Benincasa, 2019; Benincasa, 2019). 
Investigators believed the inequity may be related to the cost-benefit analysis used by FEMA 
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which incorporates taxpayer risk into the analysis. The inclusion of risk results in outcomes where 
properties that are higher in value are approved rather than those that are perceived as incurring 
higher risk. Implications of such findings for communities like Wharton includes working to make 
sure alternative sources of funding and assistance are available to such vulnerable populations. 
Additional resources include additional assistance in applying for funding to increase the 
likelihood of vulnerable populations completing applications successfully and attracting diverse 
funding options for recovery to those who may not qualify for significant federal aid. 
Community-Based Recovery Centers 
As examined in the Rhode Island case study of the March 2010 floods, aid can be given to 
citizens in a centralized approach through the creation of resource centers. The centers had 
representation from agencies directly involved with recovery funding, such as FEMA and the 
Small Business Bureau. Additionally, the centers included staff to provide resources for addressing 
social challenges associated with disaster recovery such as mental health. These centers could play 
a role in increasing transparency for citizens in the application process, which is often an area of 
frustration. Additionally, having face to face time with representatives from the agencies residents 
are applying to for assistance helps ensure citizens are filling out paperwork accurately, including 
necessary documents, and providing required information, which were identified as areas of 
concern from our stakeholder interviews and secondary analysis. Further, having help in applying 
for disaster assistance was the number one issue identified by respondents in the Kaiser Family 
Foundation survey. Community-based centers present an opportunity to improve recovery 
outcomes for citizens by creating opportunities for help in applying for assistance and providing a 
place to seek help with disaster-related concerns.  
Diversifying Funding Opportunities 
The largest amount of funding available for recovery assistance will be allocated from the 
federal government following a natural disaster through agencies including FEMA and HUD. 
While these sources have the largest dollar impact for recovery, the application process is often 
complicated and wait times can be long for both local governments and citizens. In recognizing 
such challenges, there is a large network of disaster assistance trusts, foundations, and non-profit 
organizations which can provide assistance following a disaster. These funding sources can often 
be deployed faster than federal dollars, which is important given the need for communities to return 
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back to functioning as soon as possible. Further, funding sources outside government are often 
more flexible in the areas they can be applied and could help Wharton address long-term 
challenges such as affordable housing, healthcare, and various systemic issues present in the 
community. Because of these factors, we recommend the City of Wharton consider creating a full 
or part-time “External Funding Facilitator” position to help arrange for and coordinate diverse 
recovery funding sources both within and beyond governments in order to effectively implement 
resilience and mitigation projects and increase overall preparedness. Given this, it is vital for the 
community and government to work towards strengthening long-term relationships with these 
organizations, so that in the face of disaster, those connections can be leveraged for diverse funding 
opportunities. 
As the State has a rainy-day savings fund, local communities may also think about 
supporting actions to create their own such fund to fund emergency projects in the event of another 
natural disaster. While it may be challenging to set aside amounts from the operating budget, these 
types of funding sources work to ensure local governments can cover immediate costs until 
agencies or the state can provide reimbursements. Not only is it important for local governments 
to preserve financial resources in the event of an emergency, state governments can also provide 
assistance in this capacity. The State of Texas rainy day fund is a potential source to allocate bridge 
funding following a natural disaster. If cities experience having to pay for emergency expenses out 
of pocket and it takes a long time for reimbursements to be distributed, this loss of operating money 
reinforces the potential use of bridge funding as a policy option both local and state governments 
can use to issue local reimbursements from the state while local governments dedicate emergency 
funding to internal savings accounts. By allocating from the state rainy day fund, local 
governments can ensure emergency services and projects are funded from internal sources while 
the state government can increase the speed at which reimbursements are distributed. We, 
therefore, urge the city to work with their State Senators and Representatives to modify state rainy 
day fund policies to be more readily available and usable to local governments in the event of an 
emergency.  
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Comprehensive Planning  
Although natural disasters cannot completely be anticipated or prevented, communities can 
work to reduce the severity of the effects of such events by creating and improving existing 
preparedness plans in the event of a disaster. 
Scientific Planning 
To increase the effectiveness of local government planning, we recommend the City of 
Wharton not only include all key actors in planning discussions but also consider scientific criteria 
and lessons learned from previous emergencies as critical inputs for designing and implementing 
evidence-based and flexible proposals to adapt to different emergency circumstances. As a result, 
increased communication and coordination between researchers, emergency planners, and local 
responders could lead to a balanced and complete application of resources to improve current 
disaster preparedness.   
Engaging the Community 
A complete preparedness plan requires an understanding of citizen risk perceptions and 
behavior, particularly in emergency situations. Therefore, citizen engagement serves as an 
imperative tool for local government preparedness planning. Critical actions for planning include 
making the community feel heard and taking ideas and feedback into account throughout the 
decision-making process. As a result, public participation could be enhanced through actions such 
as awareness and educational programs concerning emergency management among schools, 
business organizations, and church groups. Training sessions, flyers, radio commercials, and 
posters are some of the tools local city officials can use to educate the community on what to do 
during and after experiencing a natural disaster.  
Educational programs should also consider and plan for the possibility of experiencing 
personnel shortages to address immediate recovery needs and engage in emergency operations 
during a natural disaster. To address a potential shortage of external volunteers, citizens could 
potentially step in as home volunteers, similar to Volunteer Fire Departments, to facilitate help if 
properly trained. In considering the potential for identifying “bridge personnel” to act as volunteers 
in the event of a such a shortage, it is important for the City of Wharton to provide appropriate 
training and knowledge for volunteers to have the tools to be successful and effectively help the 
community during an emergency. Furthermore, we recommend the City of Wharton consider a 
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cross-training program for existing personnel. This strategy would increase operational readiness 
for current employees and help to address potential volunteer shortages.  
Finally, training exercises are a necessary component of comprehensive preparedness 
planning and act as a tool to test and validate strategies. Conducting exercise evaluations could 
identify gaps in planning while recognizing actions that worked well in responding to an event. 
Discussion-based exercises are commonly employed to familiarize the community with current 
plans and emergency procedures. Seminars, workshops, tabletop exercises, and games represent 
possible discussion-based exercises the City of Wharton could engage in to increase preparedness 
and local readiness. Training activities and exercises can be developed to maximize benefits 
throughout a community by including governmental, non-governmental, volunteer and faith-based 
organizations to participate and learn from different scenarios and risk-based situations.  
Improving Planning Interactions Across Institutions 
 Effective planning requires entities from all levels of government to provide input, 
knowledge, and experience into comprehensive preparedness policies and procedures. Effective 
coordination can be achieved through communication across institutions to understand roles and 
responsibilities, reduce risk affecting community resilience, and minimize the possibility of 
overlapping actions and efforts. In recognizing the importance of effective communication, we 
recommend the City of Wharton consider building on existing policies to increase local 
communication efforts throughout each stage of the planning process. For example, creating a 
means whereby different agencies and stakeholders can be involved in the planning process. This 
may come about through city meetings, forums, technological, or individual points of contact.  
Written Plans 
By making existing plans available to appropriate stakeholders and the public, written plans 
work to increase transparency and provide an opportunity for review, introspection, and actions 
necessary to ensure successful response and recovery. Having a process for updating written plans 
can increase preparedness and provides an element for monitoring actions and determining 
responsibility. In addition, official written plans serve as a tool for decision-makers in learning and 
sharing information on a wider platform to create networks of collective action, accepted 
standards, and consistent guidelines across stakeholders. Ensuring local departments and agencies 
create and update existing written emergency response and preparedness plans can serve as a 
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valuable readiness strategy and is something the City of Wharton should continue to do in working 
to improve recovery outcomes and increase response capacity. 
Communication and Collaboration 
Communication during and in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster represents a 
significant responsibility for government officials and emergency personnel in working to ensure 
residents are informed and receive updates of issues affecting daily operations and intensity of 
dangerous situations. Consistent with communication efforts, collaborating with neighboring 
jurisdictions to identify best-practices and challenges affecting successful response and recovery 
can be an effective strategy local government can use to increase resilience and identify areas of 
improvement.  
Consolidating Social Media Outlets 
Across stakeholders interviewed, perceptions regarding the success of communications 
were mixed, as some believed such efforts were successful while others believed efforts could be 
improved. Specific challenges affecting communication for Wharton include an observation that 
a lack of centralized communication created challenges for navigating social media sites and online 
information. Difficulties affecting communication can affect overall risk awareness and prevent 
successful coordination between officials and the public in delivering close to real-time 
information and responding to updates in an effective and time sensitive manner. In working to 
ensure residents have a consistent source for receiving information, consolidating social media 
sites such as Facebook and other informational web pages to one “City of Wharton” outlet to 
provide official government information and re-post important notifications can be a useful 
communication strategy and is something city officials might consider as a potential tool for future 
emergency notification efforts and normal day-to-day updates. In recognizing community 
vulnerability, the City of Wharton will need to determine if communications through tools such as 
social media sites are an effective strategy for providing information, as not everyone in a 
community will have access to the internet and online resources.  
Collaboration with Affected Communities  
Based on interviews with stakeholders, participants recognized the importance of taking 
action within their organizations to increase preparedness and overall resilience. Actions include 
reaching out to other departments and agencies in neighboring cities to gather information on what 
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worked and collaborate on how to improve future practices and emergency response actions. In 
working to determine best-practices and identify new strategies for improving response and 
recovery performance, the City of Wharton should continue and further consider expanding its 
collaborative efforts by creating official meeting opportunities with similar agencies and 
departments in affected cities and counties to provide suggestions and gather recommendations for 
addressing challenges and identifying successful practices. Through institutionalizing these 
collaborations and neighboring community engagement opportunities, both Wharton and similar 
cities affected by natural disasters can learn from the experiences and actions of other areas and 
determine if successful practices can be applied to local agencies and departments.  
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Conclusion 
The frequency of natural disasters is on the rise world-wide, as settlement patterns and 
population growth have led to greater vulnerability to devastating events. This report has served 
to examine the effects of natural disasters on both the physical landscape and human community 
of Wharton. The City of Wharton has experienced many flooding events throughout its history. 
Repeated flooding has affected businesses, homeowners, and agriculture. As a result of the 
unprecedented flooding event associated with Hurricane Harvey, the City of Wharton has taken 
action to implement new communication methods and home buyout programs to support long-
term recovery objectives. 
This report serves as a tool the City of Wharton and other communities can use to increase 
the effectiveness of response and recovery and improve planning and preparedness. First, a 
detailed literature review examines issues concerning vulnerability, problems encountered by local 
communities, recovery following natural disasters, assistance programs, community engagement, 
infrastructure and housing, best practices and challenges, and lessons learned. Second, two case 
study analyses from the Midwest and Rhode Island floods provide examples of communities that 
have experienced similar flooding situations like Wharton during and after Hurricane Harvey. In 
addition, 32 stakeholder interviews were conducted for the team to gain a better understanding of 
locally-specific problems, perceptions, and effects Hurricane Harvey had on the Wharton 
community. A summary of key findings identified in the stakeholder interviews is included to help 
the City of Wharton better understand community perceptions concerning observations, needs, and 
suggestions moving forward in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey. Finally, secondary analysis 
was conducted using data from the Kaiser Family Foundation Post-Harvey Survey and the Texas 
A&M Hurricane Harvey Household Survey. This broad survey of Texans affected by Harvey 
provides a useful representation of individual experiences in the aftermath of a natural disaster and 
works to identify key needs and problems from other, fellow citizens. This report concludes with 
team recommendations for consideration by officials regarding actions for recovery, 
comprehensive planning, and communication and collaboration.  
The City of Wharton has done an excellent job in working to recover from Hurricane 
Harvey and in efforts to mitigate the effects of future storms. They may still face future weather-
related events. We hope this report will help them in the planning and policy process they will use 
to be ready for future events.  
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Appendix A 
Stakeholder Discussion Guide 
1. General Information  
a. What is your current position within the organization? How long have you been in 
the position?   
b. How long have you been living in the Wharton area?    
c. Did you or your organization have a role during the storm? Were you or your 
organization involved in some recovery efforts?  
2. Operation of Your Organization 
a. Did your organization have any preparedness plans in place before Harvey made 
landfall? Recovery plans?  
b. What did your organization do well during Harvey? 
c. What major problems were encountered during the emergency and recovery 
process? 
3. Coordination 
a. How were communications before, during, and after Harvey? With state and 
federal government agencies? With the public?  
4. Impacts of Harvey 
a. How much damage did the City of Wharton experience as a result of Hurricane 
Harvey? 
b. Do you think Wharton had more or less damage than other communities? 
c. What was the physical impact of Harvey on your organization? How did the 
storm affect daily operations?   
d. Which communities were more affected than others? In your opinion, are there 
communities that are still susceptible to flooding in the future?  
5. Recovery  
a. What is your organization's role in the recovery (rebuilding, cleanup, etc.) 
process? Is your work continuing as a response to Harvey? 
 
b. Did your organization have adequate financial resources to respond to Harvey? 
Were the funds you had acquired internally or from outside sources?  
89 
6. Lessons Learned 
a. What actions has your organization taken to increase preparedness and resilience?  
b. What actions need to be taken to increase the resilience of the community to 
withstand future disasters?  
c. Overall, considering what other organizations and agencies did, what you think 
really worked well? What didn’t work well?  
7. Evaluation 
a. Did your organization apply for recovery assistance from government agencies at 
the state and/or federal level? What aid did your organization receive? Were any 
applications rejected, if so why?  
b. Did your organization receive recovery assistance from any non-profit 
organizations?  
c. What is your evaluation of government agencies and nonprofits’ response to 
Harvey?  
d. Did your interaction with government agencies help you in the recovery process 
(funds, directions, other examples of assistance)? Do you believe your 
organization was supported in the recovery process?  
e. Which level of government do you believe was most helpful, why? Which level 
of government do you believe was least helpful, why? 
f. Which levels of government do you believe should be responsible for various 
recovery actions? 
g. What policy changes do you recommend for resilience?   
8. Personal Experiences  
a. How were you personally affected as a result of Harvey?  
       9. Concluding Questions  
a. Is there anything else I should have asked you?  
b. Is there anyone else I should talk to?   
c. Are there any written materials or reports you could give me that could support 
our research 
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Appendix B 
Kaiser Family Foundation and Texas A&M Survey Questions 
How strongly do you agree that each of the following factors contributed to flooding? 
According to citizens that participated in the survey, the main factors which contributed to 
flooding include building in flood-prone areas, having too much land covered in concrete impeding 
the flow of water, ineffective intergovernmental collaboration in flood planning, insufficient 
capacity of stormwater systems, and insufficient capacity of levees or embankments. Such 
perceptions reflect resident knowledge in understanding factors that can potentially increase risk 
and vulnerability affecting the community in the event of a natural disaster. 
 Table 7: Percentage of respondents that agree these factors contributed to flooding 
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree 
(0) 
1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree (5) 
Don't 
Know 
Building in areas prone to flooding 6% 2% 3% 15% 14% 50% 9% 
Insufficient protection of wetlands 
and open space 4% 2% 8% 15% 20% 33% 17% 
Too much land covered in concrete 
or solid materials through which 
water cannot flow 
4% 1% 6% 15% 17% 49% 7% 
Ill-designed dams 9% 4% 7% 18% 12% 29% 21% 
Inability of dams to hold back water 8% 6% 9% 14% 16% 31% 15% 
Dam located in wrong areas 13% 9% 7% 16% 10% 20% 24% 
Inadequate levee or embankment 
designs 5% 4% 7% 19% 17% 26% 20% 
Insufficient capacity of levees or 
embankments 5% 4% 7% 14% 18% 35% 14% 
Levee or embankment located in 
wrong areas 11% 7% 10% 14% 14% 22% 18% 
Ill designed storm water system 8% 3% 10% 15% 17% 33% 11% 
Insufficient capacity of storm water 
system 4% 3% 6% 16% 19% 35% 14% 
Storm water infrastructure located in 
wrong areas 9% 7% 7% 23% 12% 22% 17% 
Ill designed retention ponds 10% 5% 11% 17% 14% 27% 17% 
Insufficient retention pond capacity 8% 5% 11% 16% 17% 27% 14% 
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Retention pond located in wrong 
areas 11% 9% 12% 24% 9% 18% 16% 
Ineffective intergovernmental 
collaboration in flood planning  4% 4% 6% 16% 16% 37% 15% 
Public’s lack of information about 
flood 6% 6% 10% 24% 18% 30% 5% 
Neglect of potential flooding issues 
by public agencies 2% 7% 10% 19% 21% 33% 8% 
Funding shortage to build flood 
protection infrastructures 3% 4% 6% 21% 18% 30% 16% 
  
 
How would you prioritize the following sectors the government needs to invest in during the 
disaster recovery period? 
In examining investment areas, citizens agree that during the disaster recovery period the 
government should prioritize investments in medical resources, water, sewer, sanitation and 
security. These sectors reflect the short-term needs citizens have identified as high-priority. 
Table 8: Percentage of respondents that believe in governmental investment in these sectors 
  
High 
Priority  
Medium 
Priority 
Low 
Priority 
Not a 
Priority at 
All  
a. Neighborhood shops/supermarkets 31.6% 34.5% 19.6% 13.4% 
b. Water 79.9% 13.4% 3.4% 1.0% 
c. Sewer 79.4% 13.9% 3.4% 1.0% 
d. Sanitation/hygiene 77.5% 15.3% 3.8% 1.4% 
e. Electricity 70.3% 23.9% 2.9% 1.4% 
f. Roads/transportation 60.8% 32.1% 3.4% 1.9% 
g. Medical resources 85.7% 9.6% 3.4% 0.0% 
h. Schools 48.3% 33.5% 12.0% 3.8% 
i. Security/Policing 69.4% 24.9% 2.9% 1.4% 
j. Solid waste (e.g. debris) management 56.0% 34.5% 6.7% 1.4% 
k. Communications (including the Internet) 57.4% 31.6% 7.2% 1.9% 
 
  
Which level of government has the greatest responsibility for the prevention of long-term 
flooding risks? 
The majority of respondents agree that when it comes to prevention of long-term flooding 
risks, all levels of government plus citizens share responsibility in addressing and taking effective 
actions to prevent long-term flooding risks. Such perceptions of government generally reflect 
92 
stakeholders in Wharton, as many individuals emphasized the collective responsibility and 
importance of all levels in working together to provide successful response and recovery actions. 
 
Figure 13: Percentages of respondents that attribute greatest responsibility according to level of government 
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61%
2%
City County State Federal All share
responsibility
None, it is a
personal citizen's
responsability
